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Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are touted as engines of sustainable economic growth. 
They span a wide spectrum of economic domains and are inclined to foster innovative 
entrepreneurship and gratify a variety of socio-economic objectives such as poverty alleviation, 
income generation, employment creation and reduction in societal inequalities. The SME sector 
in South Africa is challenged by slow growth in young businesses and dying at infancy due to 
lack of financial support. Inadequate funding results from a myriad of factors which include 
comprehensive enforcement of regulatory requirements, information asymmetry, moral 
hazards, lack of sound information on credit performance and technological divide. This study 
investigated this funding conundrum by assessing the success rate of SME applications for 
commercial funding. A quantitative cohort analysis was used on overdraft facilities obtained 
from one of the leading financial institutions in South Africa to determine the drivers of default.  
 
A time series view of macroeconomic factors and macroprudential indicators in conjunction 
with the demand and supply trends was analysed using vector autoregression techniques to 
determine the impact of the economic environment and financial market condition on access to 
funding. Unit root tests and cointegration analyses were applied to examine stationarity, short-
run and long-run relationships. The SME scorecard was developed using logistic regression on 
cohorts of applications over a seven-year observation period to determine the drivers of default 
as part of credit risk management. SME application scorecards were developed including and 
excluding bureau information. The ensuing models’ ability to differentiate risk were assessed 
using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves.  
 
The results show that, the demand and supply of SME credit is influenced by trends in the 
domestic, economic and financial environment. The robustness, stability and relevance of an 
application scorecard is enhanced by reject inference and the inclusion of bureau information. 
Small businesses operating in the service sector and having a long-standing rapport with the 
bank can easily access commercial bank funding. SMEs in the construction industry with a high 
number of credit enquiries are unlikely to survive the stringent conditions of the bank lending 
criteria. It is the prerogative of the principal business owner to honour their financial obligations 
across the credit industry if commercial bank funding is desired. Their credit quality forms the 
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Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are broadly defined as distinct business entities that 
maintain turnover, number of employees and gross asset value below or equal to pre-determined 
limits (Keskin et al., 2010). Thresholds are set by countries or governments and the limits vary 
across the globe depending on jurisdiction and economic landscapes. Segmentations can be 
applied to small businesses based on actual size, economic sector and other country specific 
variables and this accords SMEs different nomenclature across the globe. SMB is an acronym 
for Small to Mid-size Business in the Unites States, MSME stands for Micro, Small, and 
Medium-sized Enterprises in Kenya, MSMED is an Indian acronym for Micro, Small, and 
Medium Enterprise Development and SMME represent Small, Medium and Micro-sized 
Enterprises in South Africa (Chimucheka & Rungani, 2013).  
 
Despite the differences in naming conventions around the globe, SMEs share the commonality 
of segmenting small businesses by size or structure, with a clear-cut definition used to 
distinguish them from large corporates (Keskin et al., 2010). Furthermore, SMEs can be 
categorised according to size by economic sectors or domains of specialisation such as 
manufacturing, distribution, property, trading, retailing, import-export, construction, catering, 
mining, agriculture, amongst others. According to the South African National Small Business 
Act (1996), SME segmentation is particularly important for the purposes of resource allocation 
by governments, financial institutions and other SME supporting entities.  
 
Keskin et al. (2010) indicated that SMEs span a wide spectrum of economic sectors and are 
inclined to foster innovative entrepreneurship and gratify a variety of socio-economic 
objectives such as poverty alleviation, generation of income, employment creation, economic 
growth and reduction in societal inequalities. Their study showed that, in high income countries, 
SMEs contribute roughly 55% to GDP and approximately 65% to employment. In low income 
economies, SMEs account for about 60% of GDP and 70% of employment. This is supported 
by the World Bank Group (2018) statistics and other various pieces of research showing similar 
levels of contribution to the economy. Generally, SMEs are touted worldwide as engines of 





Having to start small, SMEs can be viewed as the nursery for future large corporates. Large 
firms such as the Ford Motor Company, founded by an American born Henry Ford (Edmunds, 
1952); the Canadian Advanced Light Imaging (A.L.I.) Technologies Inc., a medical industry 
firm started by Peter Keefe (Kovac, 2009); the South African fast food chain, Spur Steak 
Ranches, a brainchild of Allen Ambor (Spur Group, 2012); the Chinese trading firm, Alibaba, 
formed by Jack Ma (Schuman, 2014) and the Capitec Bank in SA, founded by a consortium of 
micro-lenders (James, 2014) are examples of companies that started as SMEs before they 
developed into large corporates. However, high growth of SMEs into large corporates are 
exceptional and rare (McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010). In as much as their coverage is wide and 
their worth is recognised and commended, there exists a multitude of challenges inhibiting SME 
growth and performance across the globe (Anderson & Ullah, 2014). Growth is suppressed in 
small businesses by design or by default.  
 
A study conducted by Anderson and Ullah (2014) revealed that growth inhibition by design is 
attributable to aspects of negative attitude and lack of motivation. Some owners choose to 
remain small in order to avoid growing pains and potential hazards associated with growth 
stages over the business life cycle. Growth inhibition by default is driven by the general 
dynamics in the operating environment and economic landscape. Limited resources in the areas 
of finance, shortage of skilled human capital, poor planning and lack of expertise, education 
and training are some of the major sources of perpetual smallness (Fatoki & Garwe, 2010). 
Businesses remain operational but are maintained at infancy stages of growth. The worst-case 
scenario entails closure of businesses which cannot withstand intense growing pressure owing 
to some of the circumstances described above and other growth inhibitors. SME growth, 
development and success dynamics are therefore diverse and complex. Growth is inhibited due 
to of access to commercial bank funding (Chimucheka & Rungani, 2013) among other factors.  
 
1.2 Problem Definition 
 
Most of SME financing options are limited to inception stages of a business cycle, which 
contribute to seed and initial growth funding. From inception, small businesses are largely 
funded through personal savings, family, friends, donations, business angels, retained earnings, 
etc. (Chimucheka & Rungani, 2013). As businesses develop and expand, a wider spectrum of 
funding is sought to finance operations and rapid growth, one of which is commercial bank 




adequate funding is the main operating and growth constraint of SMEs (Berger & Udell, 1998).  
As SMEs form an integral aspect of most economies globally, it is crucial to investigate this 
constraint and suggest ways to mitigate the challenge. Most researchers base their analysis on 
primary, survey data, though in different timelines but their results point to similar conclusions. 
Figure 1 can be used as a statistical view encapsulating the state of access to finance when 
survey data is considered. Of the registered SMEs in South Africa, the success rate of accessing 
formal credit has been observed to be 9% (Makina et al., 2015) 
 
Figure 1: Access to Credit by Registered SMEs 
 
Source: Makina et al., 2015 
 
Given that vast research on SME funding in South Africa is based on cross-sectional data, it is 
difficult to make a causality claim when establishing the link between SME specific attributes 
and access to finance (Makina et al., 2015). This study therefore seeks to utilise longitudinal 
secondary data to perform regression analyses to shed more light on factors affecting the 
success rate of SMEs in accessing commercial funding. The behaviour of borrowers during 
their credit term is investigated. The result is mainly used by the credit lenders in determining 
applicants who are eligible for funding based on the presumption that past trends predict the 
future. Of importance is the inclusion credit bureau information into the analysis. This 
encapsulates the market wide behaviour of applicants. If the applicants were granted loans from 
other finance houses, it is difficult to obtain their default tendencies directly from other lending 
peers due to bureaucracy and red tape issues. The applicants’ credit bureau information 
therefore becomes pivotal and a good proxy in picking up the holistic credit behaviour of 




Whereas primary data may restrict researchers to a specific jurisdiction or industry, this report 
encapsulates a countrywide view of applications over time from different sectors and 
geographical location of the South African economy. With large datasets to be extracted over 
time, this analysis is set to provide more stable and robust view of the SME credit patterns. 
 
Further, given that South Africa is one of the most industrialised economy on the African 
continent with leading financial markets (Makina et al., 2015), the analysis will help understand 
if this benefit filters through SME funding and growth. The main problem to be investigated is 
the determinants of the success rate of SMEs’ access to commercial funding in South Africa. 
This will be done using a comprehensive advanced statistical model, making use of a wealth of 
longitudinal historic information. To the best of our knowledge, inadequate funding of SMEs 
by financial institutions in South Africa is as a result of a myriad of factors which include: 
comprehensive enforcement of regulatory requirements, lack of collateral, information 
asymmetry, moral hazards, lack of sound track records on credit performance, technological 
divide between lenders and borrowers and lack of financial records. Investigating the financing 
conundrum of South African SMEs through tracking cohorts of SME loan applications forms 
the fulcrum of this study.  
 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
This research seeks to provide answers to the following questions: 
 What is the correlation between the demand of SME credit against the South African 
economy and credit market industry?   
 What is the correlation between the supply of SME credit against the South African 
economy and credit market industry?   
 What model can be used in establishing drivers of default based on the availability of 
external information such as bureau information? 
 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the success rate of SME application for commercial 
funding using data obtained from one of the leading financial institutions in South Africa. 
Following is a list of research objectives: 
 
1. To assess the relationship between the demand of credit against the economic and credit 




2. To assess the relationship between the supply of credit against the economic and credit 
market industry growth.  
3. To identify drivers of default and determine how the model is affected by introducing 
external information such as bureau data.  
 
This study seeks to test the following hypotheses.   
 
Hypothesis 1: The volume of SME loan applications (demand) is a function of industry wide 
credit market activity and economic growth as reflected in key macroprudential indicators and 
macroeconomic factors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The acceptance rate (supply) of loan applications is a function of industry wide 
credit market activity and economic growth as reflected in key macroprudential indicators and 
macroeconomic factors. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The SME application scorecard is a better fit than a null model. The robustness 
of the scorecard is improved by the inclusion of internal and external risk drivers in the model. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
 
This research explores secondary quantitative data obtained from a consumer credit context. 
The data herein are analogous to lifetime data as they show a cohort of credit consumers with 
different loan repayment behaviours over a given observation period. The commercial bank 
product offering chosen is the Overdraft (OD) facility. This is a type of loan that is linked to a 
transactional account, usually a Cheque account. It allows the account holder to withdraw 
money in excess of the credit balance up to an approved credit limit.  
 
Customers (SMEs in this case) can utilise the full limit granted or a portion thereof and interest 
is charged only on the utilized portion of the OD. This loan facility accords customers the 
flexibility to transact, drawdown, repay and utilize again within the bounds of the credit limit, 
making the facility both transactional and revolving. For this study, the dataset consists of loans 
applications presented to the bank between July 2012 to July 2019. Application and behavioural 




representing standard information provided by through the door customers because the model 
will be applied to this population. 
 
1.5 Justification of the Study 
 
This study seeks to identify factors leading to the acceptance or rejection of SME application 
for commercial funding. Importantly, growing a quality SME portfolio is vital from both the 
lenders’ (supply side) and SMEs’ (demand side) perspective. Furthermore, in the developed 
world, corporate and retail segments are gradually offering limited opportunities for credit 
expansion (Caire, 2009). Evidently, the SME sector offers high yields and an attractive market 
segment.  This trend is likely to filter into the developing market as well given that this part of 
the world trails behind the developed economies in various aspects including SME growth. 
Resultantly, the lenders need to build good quality portfolios which is the main offering in this 
study. As discussed in Section 1.1, the SME sector forms the backbone anchoring the future 
growth of many economies across the globe. To enhance meaningful contribution to 
employment rate and economic growth and development, SME progression need to be 
substantiated by increased credit. What banks perceive as good risk clients eligible for approval 
of commercial bank funding is another offering in this study. Thus, the justification of this study 
emanates from the potential benefits envisaged for the lenders and the borrowers within the 
SME credit market as well as the benefits accrued to the South African economy at large.  
 
1.6 Organisation of the Study 
 
The study is organised as follows: 
 Chapter 1 introduces the research work while outlining the background, context of the 
work, the problem statement, research questions, aims and objectives. The research 
justifications, motivation and contributions conclude the chapter.  
 Chapter 2 presents the literature and theoretical background to the SME credit market. 
Literature review is linked to the research questions and objectives given in Chapter 1, 
highlighting issues in development finance with regards to SME credit market. Credit 
risk management concepts, the possibilities and pitfalls associated with various 




 Chapter 3 describes the methodologies followed. This chapter broadly describes the 
research design and research methods. It provides details around data collection 
instruments and the specific features on the relevance of the methodologies employed.  
 Chapter 4 details the key results, including statistical analysis and whether the results 
are significant. As a matter of good practice, some of the primary evidence in this 
section will be presented in the Appendix section as appropriate.  
 Chapter 5 concludes the study while proposing recommendations, mitigation solutions 
to the SME financing problem. The chapter evaluates that the objectives of the study 











This section presents theoretical and empirical review of the SME financial market:  challenges 
presented through credit lending to SMEs, data requirements to facilitate lending, the economic 
and financial landscape driving demand and supply of SME credit as well as credit scoring and 
applicability of credit risk management concepts within the SME framework. 
 
2.2 Definition of Terms and Concepts 
 
This section discusses the terms and concepts which will be used throughout the study. 
 
2.2.1 Credit Lending 
 
Credit refers to borrowed money that SMEs can use to purchase goods and services required 
for their operations to run (Sumit et al., 2006). SMEs obtain credit from a credit grantor, the 
commercial banks in this case with an agreement to pay back the amount borrowed plus 
applicable finance charges, within an agreed time frame. Credit can be granted in various forms 
enlisted herewith: Revolving credit, where a maximum credit limit is granted and the borrowers 
can utilise up to that limit, Charge cards, where total balance need to be repaid or settled every 
month, Service credit in which the borrower receives services with charges settled monthly and 
Instalment credit where regular instalments of fixed amounts over a fixed time period are paid 
(Hendricks, 2011). Examples of instalment credit are vehicle finance and mortgages. As 
discussed in section 1.4, the scope of this study is based on a revolving credit type of lending 
known as overdraft facility which can be sought to meet SME liquidity needs. It is important 
to note that, with OD loans, SMEs pay interest only on the utilised portion of funds drawn 
against the total commitment. 
 
2.2.2 Credit Risk 
Credit risk refers to the potential hazard that the borrower may fail to meet contractual 
obligations, that is, failure to make the required payments (principal amount and interest 




as this amounts to cashflow disruptions and arising steep debt collection costs, sometimes 
unforeseen. As part of credit risk management, the lender thrives to maintain credit risk 
exposure within acceptable parameters derived from its risk appetite and risk tolerance. This 
filters through the loan granting landscape. When lending to borrowers, credit grantors make 
use of the applicant’s credit record to determine the financial risk as a way to minimise financial 
losses. The credit information, encapsulated in the bureau credit score is often the primary 
resource guiding the grantor’s decision. A credit score is a number that reflects the applicant’s 
creditworthiness. Good risk customers are normally assigned higher scores and favourable loan 
pricing conditions. It is therefore imperative for SMEs to maintain a good credit record in order 
to take advantage of the convenience credit can provide. Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) 
provide lenders with the bureau score at an agreed fee. On the South African credit market, the 
retail sector bureau scores are often obtained from CRAs such as TransUnion and Experian. 
This study will make use of the SME principal owner’s bureau information obtained from 
Experian, as a proxy for the SME performance on credit facilities.  
 
2.2.3 Credit Rationing 
Credit rationing is a market imperfection or market failure phenomenon. Lenders tend to 
apportion the supply of credit based on market conditions and their risk appetite (Mutezo, 
2015). Credit rationing occurs due to information and control limitations in the financial 
markets. This event reflects failure of price mechanisms which in turn miscarries market 
equilibrium. SME credit industry suffer credit rationing when SMEs fail to provide sufficient 
collateral to hedge against potential credit losses by the lenders. 
 
2.2.4 Information Asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry is a market failure problem encountered within a financial system due 
to inequalities in the distribution of information (Ocran, 2012). It is crucial to gather adequate 
and reliable financial information for any sound financial decisions. Information asymmetry 




information benefitting at the expense of the other parties with information of less quality and 
quantity. This phenomenon contributes to market inefficiency in development finance 
particularly with SME credit market. 
 
2.2.5 Adverse Selection 
 
If parties take advantage of information asymmetry ahead of a transaction, this potentially 
results in a scenario referred to as Adverse Selection (AS). In the SME credit market, lender is 
confronted with the challenges of failure to differentiate good and bad risk loan applicants 
because the borrower might have information that the lender may not have. Failure to establish 
this distinction may cause lenders to price loans with the same interest rate. This tends to 
penalise good risk borrowers and reward the bad risk, hence the term “adverse selection”. In 
economics theory, the consequence that AS brings is that, due to high interest rate, safe projects 
(low risk SMEs) will have a lower rate of return (Ocran, 2012). This leaves high risk projects 
in the market with banks charging even higher interest rate to reflect their high-risk loan 
portfolio. If the market is awash with bad projects, this is nicknamed the market for lemons in 
economic theory (Akerlof, 1970). 
 
2.2.6 Moral Hazards 
 
If parties take advantage of information asymmetry after a transaction, this becomes a market 
failure phenomenon called Moral Hazard (MH). The contract places incentives upon one party 
to take immoral behavioural steps which can be unobservable but are prejudicial to another 
party in the transaction who bears the fallout (Ocran, 2012). AS and MH prohibits the markets 
to allocate resources efficiently. In SME credit market, MH occurs when the borrower has 
already acquired the loan, violate the original commitment and engage in high risk investments. 
After the transaction lenders are not completely in control of what SMEs use the funds for. MH 
tends to high levels of bad debt and lenders take a toll. To ensure profitability and safety, some 
lenders implement credit rationing programs (Huang et al., 2014). 
 
2.2.7 Transaction Costs 
 
In economic theory, a surcharge incurred in making an economic or financial exchange or the 
cost to participate in a market is known as transaction cost (Ocran, 2012). As shown in Figure 




storage of information; cost of execution and monitoring of the transaction (Ocran, 2012). For 
SMEs to participate effectively in the credit industry, the governments needs to play a role in 
creating an operating environment that reduces transaction costs thereby improving the viability 
of SME operations (Huang et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 2: Transaction Costs 
 
Source: (Ocran, 2012) 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Information Asymmetry and Lending 
 
According to a study by Duan, Han, & Yang (2009), information asymmetry is the leading 
contributing factor of credit rationing. Uncertainties in the behaviour of SMEs makes lenders 
face AS and MH challenges. Furthermore, if SMEs fail to provide standardized financial 
statements, the lender remains limited in knowledge about the borrower (Badulescu, 2010). In 
Belgium, there are important disclosure and audit requirements in standardisation of the 
financial reports (Van Campenhout & Van Caneghem, 2009), without which commercial 
funding can still remain a nightmare. If these requirements are not met, it becomes difficult for 




it poses further complications for lenders to separate between bankable (good) and doubtful 
projects and the pricing of loans under this scenario may result in inefficient selection of fund 
allocation.  
 
Information asymmetry is aggravated by high levels of SME operational risk. SMEs often 
operate in very short period. Research by Duan et al. (2009) show that a quarter of small firms 
exit the market within a couple of years in operation while 52.7% disappear within half a decade 
due to bankruptcy, business failure, historic non-performing loans and other extenuating 
factors. With these alarming levels of SME mortality, it therefore becomes difficult for the SME 
to provide sound and substantial historic standardised financial statements when required 
during credit application. Issuance of loans in such circumstances increases the risks of banks 
substantially (Duan et al., 2009). The authors also observed that SMEs suffer more from credit 
rationing compared to large corporates due to their inferior position in transaction costs. 
 
In China, Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2014) argued that difficulties in financing SMEs is due to 
information asymmetry. Limited finance continues to be the bottleneck restricting growth of 
SMEs globally. In Tunisia, Cote D’Ivoire, Mozambique and Kenya, SMEs perceive that 
unawareness of the availability of credit lines is one of the leading determinants of funding 
difficulties over and above lack of business support, lack of advice from the financial 
institution, complexity, cumbersome loan application process and inadequate collateral (Gana, 
2013; Ghimire & Abo, 2013; Hezron & Hilario, 2016; Kiveu, 2015). These countries are 
located at the 4 geographical cardinal points of the continent implying that the problem of 
information asymmetry can be generalised to most African countries. The authors suggested 
that more social interactions, relationship lending whereby lenders develop a relationship or 
reach a common understanding with borrowers to enhance effective communication and ICT 
solutions could help curb lack of awareness of funding opportunities in Africa. 
 
2.4  Stylised Facts about the SME Sector in South Africa 
 
The SME segment is regarded an integral aspect of the economy in South Africa. The 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) developed and published the National Small Business 
Act (1996) wherein SMEs are defined across several economic industries for ease of funding 
and other forms of support by the public and private sectors. DTI is a government department 




Act (1996), SMEs are segmented by revenue, gross asset value and size, with maximum 
thresholds of R40 million, R18million and 200 employees respectively (Appendix A). 
Empirical studies by Chimucheka and Rungani (2013) show that, SMEs in SA make up 90% 
of formal businesses, provide employment to about 60% of the labour force and total economic 
SME output accounts for roughly 34% of GDP. However, growth is inhibited due to various 
factors, the main one being the lack of access to funding.  
 
The DTI (2008) reported on a comprehensive view of the SME sector in South Africa. The 
range in size of SMEs is very broad, covering registered to informal businesses. SMEs range 
from family businesses with a staff complement of about one hundred employees to micro-
enterprises comprising survivalists and self-employed sole proprietors from the bottom end of 
the economy. The latter forms the majority of the SMEs in SA. These can take various forms 
including backyard manufacturing, street vending, home based evening jobs, among other 
informal forms of trade with little growth potential and minimum likelihood to afford 
employees. During the first quarter of 2008, a total number of 2 182 823 SMEs were reported 
(The DTI, 2008) across its nine provinces. 
 
The South African government recognises the value of SMEs as evidenced by the establishment 
of the Ministry of Small Business Development in 2014 responsible for the facilitation of SMEs 
(SEDA, 2016). This department operates under various agencies. The Small Enterprise 
Development Agency (SEDA) implements SME business strategy. The Small Enterprise 
Finance Agency (SEFA), South African Micro-Finance Apex Fund (SAMAF) and Khula 
Enterprise Finance Limited provide funding requirements of less than or equal to R3 million 
(SEDA, 2016) through the provision of revolving loans, term loans, bridging finance among 
other governmental financial support streams. Technical support is provided through the 
National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) targeted for young population aged between 14 
and 35 years. The National Empowerment Fund (NEF) too provides non-financial support to 
black owned SMEs. 
 
Globally, SMEs evolve with economies, this too is expected for SME landscape in South 
Africa. SA has recently been characterised by major economic and political events. These 
include the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, a full cycle of interest rates (tightening to 
accommodative), a peak in commodity cycle (SEDA, 2016) and the changes in political 




Accordingly, the SME sector is assumed to have adapted the new and evolving circumstances 
experienced by the economy. Despite the unparalleled government intervention and support, 
individual SME growth remained inhibited by various challenges at various scales depending 
on the size and scope. Commercial lenders are unlikely to fund young and informal businesses 
forming the greatest proportion of SMEs by volumes. SMEs in Gauteng are more likely to get 
funding compared to those in Mpumalanga and Northern Cape. This is primarily due to less 
sophisticated nature of the latter areas and a lack of access to infrastructure and a widening gap 
in technological divide. Skills shortage, permit delays and high levels of crime are some of the 
obstacles hampering SME growth across the country (SEDA, 2016). To gauge trends of SME 
performance in accordance with the major economic activities and other extenuating factors 
discussed above, summary statistics are provided below for the operating years 2008, 2015 and 
2018, to accommodate changes seen over the decade. 
 
Table 1: SME Distribution by Province (2008 vs 2015) 
  
Number (2008Q1)  Number (2015Q2)  
Total Formal Informal Other Total Formal Informal Other 
2 182 823 666 501 1 420 933 95 389  2 251 821 667 433 1 497 860 86 528 
Western Cape 223 933 114 976 95 212 13 745  230 324 110 107 110 188  10 030  
Eastern Cape 218 865 56 579 154 631  7 655  197 366 50 670 141 739 4 957 
Northern Cape 29 894 11 450 11 768  6 676  20 611 8 534 9 058  3 019  
Free State 114 949 31 040 76 127  7 783  96 846 26 224 60 816 9 806 
KwaZulu-Natal 418 406 102 591 289 347 26 468 373 434  74 976 283 165 15 293 
North West 109 860 25 817 76 855  7 188 112 856 27 430 79 153  6 273 
Gauteng 687 556 270 093 405 180 12 283  785 321  306 231 465 100 13 989 
Mpumalanga 193 259 29 760 156 814  6 685 185 399  35 208 141 129  9 063 
Limpopo 186 101 24 193 155 001  6 907 249 663 28 054 207 512 14 098 
Source (SEDA, 2016) 
 
Table 1 shows that most SMEs operate in Gauteng followed by KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and the 
least is in Northern Cape. During the period 2008 to 2015, SMEs in SA increased by a mere 
3%, way less than the GDP growth of 14% over the observation period (SEDA, 2016). Limpopo 
and Gauteng SMEs grew by 34% and 14 % respectively while the Northern Cape numbers 
plummeted by a whopping 31% over the review period followed by Free State at 16%.  
 
Table 2: SME Distribution by Economic Sector 
  
Number 







Total Total Formal Informal Other R million R million R million 
2 182 823  2 251 821  667 433  1 497 860 86 528  2 908 020 815 636 1.29 
Agriculture 87 820 56 774 0 0  56 774 n/a  35 213  n/a 




Manufacturing 267 817 201 459 62 657  138 801 0 658 740 111 672 3.27 
Electricity, gas & water 4 252 7 456 6 656 801 0 7 488  38 647  1 
Construction 252 233 299 242 77 098  222 143 0 229 016 38 804 0.77 
Trade & Accommodation 974 083 944 467 186 798 757 669 0 1 160 560 129 144 1.23 
Transport & Communication 122 370 133 134 56 620 76 514 0 134 152  87 612 1.01 
Finance & Bus. Services 236 740 271 712 172 423 99 289 0 571 384 183 430 2.1 
Community 227 243 305 624 105 181 200 444 0 111 424  50 982  0.36 
Other 7 569 29 754 0 0 29 754 0 70 711 0 
Source (SEDA, 2016) 
 
On a different dimension under the same review period, Table 2 shows that most SMEs operate 
in the domestic trade, recorded in Table 2 as Trade and Accommodation. This sector contributes 
the highest turnover in rand terms. However, GDP contribution is highly driven by Finance and 
business services and turnover per SME is mostly explained by the mining sector. Between 
2008 and 2015, industries served shifted from a drop in Agriculture and Manufacturing and 
moved to Community and Construction. The latest trends show that SMEs continue to operate 
in Gauteng. In its latest report, SEDA (SEDA, 2019) indicated that 34.70% of South African 
SMEs are in Gauteng, followed by KZN at 16% then Limpopo at 12.30% as shown in the 
2018Q3 distribution of SMEs in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: SMEs Distribution by Province (2017-2018) 
  
2017Q3  2018Q2  2018Q3 Quartely Change Yearly Change 
Number  Distr. Number  Distr. Number  Distr. Number  % Number  % 
Western Cape 268 821 11.90%  279 354  11.40%  260 439  10.20% -18 915  -6.8% -8 381 -3.10% 
Eastern Cape  190 749 8.50% 215 334 8.80% 210 986 8.30% -4 348  -2.00%  20 237 10.60% 
Northern Cape  14 940 0.70% 19 690 0.80% 27 760 1.10% 8 070 41.00%  12 820 85.80% 
Free State 110 291 4.90% 118 452 4.90% 101 709 4.00% -16 744 -14.10%  -8 583 -7.80% 
KwaZulu-Natal   325 051  14.40% 372 151 15.20%  400 967 15.70%  28 817 7.70%  75 917 23.40% 
North West 125 329 5.60% 126 470 5.20% 125 046 4.90%  -1 423 -1.10% -283 -0.20% 
Gauteng  687 867 30.60%  808 598 33.10%  888 120 34.70%  79 522 9.80% 200 253  29.10% 
Mpumalanga   216 328 9.60% 204 352 8.40% 226 230 8.80%  21 878 10.70% 9 902  4.60% 
Limpopo  311 911 13.90%  296 359 12.10% 315 634 12.30%  19 275 6.50% 3 722 1.20% 
  2 251 286 100.00% 2 440 760 100.00% 2 556 891 100.00% 116 132 4.80% 305 605  13.60% 
Source (SEDA, 2019) 
 
The number of SMEs in South Africa grew by 13.60% year on year from 2017Q3 to 2018Q3 
driven by 29.1% growth in Gauteng and 23.40% growth in KZN. Negative growth was seen in 
the Free State, Western Cape and North West. The exploratory data analysis in this study will 
be used to determine whether these growth patterns align with the demand of credit in the 




continue to trail behind in the volume of SMEs due to predominantly rural nature of the 
province, bearing the impact of technological divide and poor infrastructure. 
 
SEDA (SEDA, 2019) reported that the relative market share of trade and accommodation sector 
contracted due to faster growth in other sectors such as community services, construction, 
financial & business services. On the other hand, the global economic slowdown poses a 
downside in domestic export demand, impacting negatively on trade. Turnover contracted 
across the sectors by 3.6% year on year up to the third quarter of 2018(SEDA, 2019) due to 
weak economic conditions. Eskom crisis has been a major risk due to load shedding, potential 
credit rating downgrade and pressure on the fiscus. The 2019 national budget showed 
deterioration in fiscal metrics due to Eskom and other State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) financial 
crises and downscaled growth forecasts. The real GDP for South Africa is estimated to grow 
by 1.3% in 2019 and 1.9% in 2020 (South African National Treasury, 2019). 
 
2.5 Empirical Literature: SME Funding Determinants 
SME funding determinants can be classed into environmental and internal factors. 
Environmental factors include government supported developments, industry & academic 
collaborations, financial resources as well as market dynamics. Internal factors are SME 
specific characteristics. Studies undertaken in literature show a combined view of these classes 
of determinants as discussed hereunder. 
SMEs form an integral part of the economy as they are seen to be a suitable solution to cope 
with developmental issues such as high unemployment rate and poverty. In India, 30 million 
small firms contribute 45% of GDP although the funding gap of $126 billion has recently been 
recorded (Raghu & Pankaj, 2019). Most of these firms exist in the manufacturing industry and 
conform to the government’s “Make in India” initiative to boost economic development and 
economic growth. By way of binary logit regression model, the authors established that 
financial feasibility and age of the principal owner are the most important drivers of credit 
extension. The sentiment on the market is that creditors need to lift loan sanctions at young age, 
improve the flow of credit to support innovation and rapid growth in this key sector. In 
Bangladesh, SMEs require financing for start-up capital, working capital and fixed capital. Poor 
access to capital due to lack of adequate collateral was observed to be a major constraint 




Many donor organizations and financial institutions have in the past stepped back from SME 
credit financing due to poor track record of such programs in developing countries. Institutional 
failure example is the lending program in Tunisia known as the Fonds de Promotion et de 
Décentralisation Industrielle (FOPRODI). The fund was set up in 1974 to promote and develop 
new industrial SMEs, decentralize the industry and encourage regional development (Bechri et 
al., 2001). Due to extremely low repayment rate, the program barely survived two decades and 
it finally collapsed in 1997.  
 
The impetus for the creation of commercial banks is driven by business opportunities with a 
mandate to maximise profits and mitigate risk. Commercial banks consider SMEs high-risk 
entities which are costly to serve and therefore take a reluctant approach to finance them (IFC, 
2010). The risk is often associated with poor financial records, management shortcomings, 
limited equity, lack of diversification and little experience. The World Bank Group (2018) 
added that, the main barriers to SME funding include macroeconomic volatility in developing 
countries and peer to peer competition in developed countries. As such, the proportion of SME 
lending in the aggregate bank credit portfolio ranges between 5 percent and 20 percent in 
developing countries such as Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria.  
 
On a similar note, the bank-debt ratio of SMEs accounts for less than a quarter of SME total 
debt financing in Ghana (World Bank Group, 2018). The ratio is also positively correlated with 
firm size and tangibility of assets. SMEs ultimately resort to alternative sources of funding 
which tend to be more expensive, thereby hampering productivity, competitiveness, innovation 
and investments (IFC, 2010). Another issue identified in literature within the SME credit 
market is related lending. This occurs when banks issue loans to companies owned and 
controlled by bank officials at favourable concessionary lending rates. In Mexico, these loans 
were identified to default 33% more with a 30% less recovery rate than unrelated lending 
facilities (La Porta et al., 2003). As such, this is seen as a manifestation of looting. 
 
Complications to funding by commercial banks in South Africa lie in the SMEs’ failure to 
comply with financial regulations as required by the national credit regulators (Ayyagari & 
Beck, 2007). Financial lending institutions are bound by country specific as well as 
international legislation and regulatory barriers that potentially restrict SMEs access to 
commercial funding. South African credit lenders adhere to regulations such as the National 




Credit Regulator (NCR) administers the provisions of the NCA across the credit lending 
industry.  
 
The key feature of the NCA(2004) is to promote access to credit market and financial inclusion 
while deterring reckless lending. For example, through NCA, credit lending institutions are 
prohibited from conducting businesses with minors under the age of 18 unless there is strong 
motivation to override the directive. In addition to NCA regulations, FICA strongly enforces 
commercial banks to perform Customer Due Diligence (CDD) also known as Know Your 
Customer (KYC) process. This entails gathering high quality and usable information within 
acceptable quantities on credit recipients prior to the extension of credit to curb information 
asymmetry and circumvent financial crimes. FICA regulation adheres to the international 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) whose main objective is to fight illicit financial flows 
such as terrorism financing and money laundering. 
 
2.6 Remedial Actions and Alternative Sources of Finance 
 
As part of the remedial actions, Binswanger & van den Brink (2005) proposed client 
diversification in the funders’ portfolio in order to contain covariant risk. Further, lenders were 
strongly recommended to isolate themselves from the state and opportunistic behaviours. On 
the other hand, borrowers were encouraged to take up insurance cover to guard against any 
potential idiosyncratic and systemic risks. Lieno (2014) recommended an improvement in bank 
models to adapt specialised services for small businesses by establishing processes to handle 
the extensive file processes in accordance with the legal and judicial framework.  
 
Microfinance Institutions (MFI) form an alternative source of funding by offering micro loans 
to borrowers who are unable to access conventional loan services. MFIs’ key business purpose 
is lending to SMEs (Jarotschkin, 2013). To improve the performance of SMEs, MFIs recently 
established SME specific product called meso-finance to meet the financial needs of entities 
above the microfinance level and below the commercial financial needs (Lieno, 2014). Another 
attractive feature of MFIs is the establishment of joint liability schemes whereby loans are 
issued at group level, rather than individual.  
 
Joint liability enables lenders to collect more information on borrowers thereby reducing the 




sentiments, group lending is often associated with incentives such as short maturities, increased 
loan amounts,  personalized repayment schedules and forced savings: (Binswanger & van den 
Brink, 2005; Garmaise & Natividad, 2013; Ghate, 2000; Lieno, 2014; Morvant, 2007; Yaron 
& Manos, 2007).  Examples of MFI as per the Forbes (2010) article are: the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, Consumer Credit Union 'Economic Partnership' in Russia, Enda inter-arabe in 
Tunisia and Asmitha Microfin Ltd. In India. 
 
Venture Capital (VC) is another form of SME financing. VC structures provide equity rather 
than debt and thereby lowers the debt to equity ratio for high risk entities. Further, VC set up 
enables the fund suppliers a share in the funded business an opportunity to be actively involved 
in business operations to protect their interest (Kitchen, 1989). Furthermore, bank affiliated 
VCs play a crucial role in promoting relationship lending and mitigating AIs that are 
detrimental to SME lending (Konishi & Suzuki, 2007) by being the nexus strengthening ties 
between SMEs and commercial banks. The authors observed that in Japan, over the period 1996 
to 2000, more than 50% of the top 100 VCs were subsidiaries of commercial banks. They 
concluded that commercial banks investment via VC subsidiaries benefit SMEs by increasing 
credit availability and in turn reducing borrowing costs. 
 
There has been notable efforts across the globe developed to enhance vibrant entrepreneurial 
culture using non-bank service provision through financial and non-financial support. Risky 
capital can be financed through non-bank lending programs. Hometown Investment Trust funds 
(HIT) offer financial intermediation between lenders and borrowers who know each other and 
are often project driven, lenders can choose to invest in specific projects.  HIT has recently been 
adopted as a national strategy in Japan. In Thailand, the Market for Alternative Investment 
finances SMEs through capital markets (Yoshino & Taghizadeh Hesary, 2014).  
 
Non-bank programs enable SMEs to access stable funding, enhance sustainable growth, enforce 
transparency and good governance, alleviate AI issues and promote powerful networking. On 
the South African SME market, SEDA support structures range from conceptualisation to 
expansion phases of SMEs with close involvement in training, business registrations and 
business planning. Nonetheless, non-bank support services are also characterised by challenges, 






Figure 3: Challenges and Policy Responses to Non-Bank Lending Programs 
 
Source (OECD, 2018) 
 
2.7 Information and SME Lending 
 
The success of the SME credit market is largely dependent on the ability of the lending 
practitioners and researchers to extract meaningful information needed to identify the key 
performance indicators (Page, 2016). As such, it is essential to establish systems that capture 
the right data which can easily be usable by the lending entity. The data should be set up in well 
defined auditable processes under strict discipline to ensure authenticity, transparency and 
accuracy. In developing countries, the lack of SME credit rating scheme has been a challenge 
for the SME credit market (Yoshino et al., 2015). SMEs are characterised by unstable financial 
structures as some business activities are seasonal, some are opaque and new start up enterprises 
lack credit history. The increased AI enforces banks to increase interest rates to contain the risk 
of default.  
The motivation for developing SME credit bureau database is to shield banks from risky lending 
and reduce borrowing costs for less risky SMEs. For Thailand, Yoshino et al.(2015) suggested 




financial records. However, the analysis was based on the National Credit Bureau (NCB) of 
Thailand from where the authors made use of the loan amounts and repayment behaviour of 
SMEs available on the NCB. The scheme was developed using statistical approaches such as 
Cluster Analysis and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This approach may not work for 
African countries due to lack of credit bureau databases for SMEs. 
 
Moody’s, a financial services company and a top credit rating agency, developed RiskCalc, a 
database for private companies which incorporates market information and SME historical 
performance on credit facilities on a global scale (Page, 2016). According to the author, this 
information can be used by lenders within the credit lending space in generating effective 
triggers for early warning detection against credit deterioration on SMEs. OECD (2018) on the 
other hand, recently introduced  OECD SCOREBOARD, a database created to  capture SME 
data as a way to reduce AI and improve the SME credit market.   
 
In most SME credit market research studies, authors developed an understanding of the credit 
market using either demand/supply side survey data as well as the national/international 
information. The literature indicates that most of the information has been primary or secondary 
cross-sectional data organised in a panel form (Beck et al., 2008; Chimucheka & Rungani, 
2013; Cusmano, 2015; Fatoki & Garwe, 2010; Levy, 1993; Mutezo, 2015; OECD, 2018; Page, 
2016; Schmukler & Abraham, 2017; Yoshino et al., 2015).  
 
This study proposes the use of longitudinal data from a single high ranked financial institution 
in South Africa. The analysis will be done on a cohort basis using novel statistical approaches 
that have recently been adopted in the banking sector to model credit risk within retail credit 
portfolios (Jilek, 2008). Loan applications will be tracked for each calendar month over a period 
of seven years. Due to the lack of SME specific bureau database in SA, the credit performance 
of the principal account holder of each SME will be used as a proxy. In addition, the 
macroeconomic information will be considered over the review period. The use of internal and 
external longitudinal data contributes increased volumes of data and enhances stability and 
robustness of the resulting models. 
 





The condition of smallness either by design or by default as described in Section 1.1 results in 
some micro enterprises having equity finance as their greater portion of their capital structure 
compared to other streams of finance such as debt (Anderson & Ullah, 2014). Perennial SME 
infants tend to reinvest profits and by all means possible avoid taking debt and therefore lack 
the drive to demand credit, even financial liberalisation has little impact in such instances 
(Aryeetey et al., 1994). The authors, on the back of their surveys conducted in Ghana, assert 
that, highly profitable opportunities could be missed due to lack of willingness to access 
external funding on the part of these microenterprises. On the other hand, banks have shown 
little interest in developing SME market niche due to lack of bankable demands (Aryeetey et 
al., 1994). Therefore, the smaller the firm, the lower the demand and supply of SME credit. 
After the 2007 Eurozone financial crisis, the real economic activity declined in most parts of 
the world. This has been reflected in increases in government bond yields. The enormous credit 
expansion experienced prior to the credit crunch led to large debt overhang which is a measure 
of debt to output in private firms (Holton et al., 2012). On the back of the crisis, lending to the 
private sector drastically plummeted. The actual drivers of this decrease have been debatable 
over time. Some researchers identified weak demand on the part of the firms (Campello et al., 
2010) whilst others alluded to the tightening of the credit conditions on the lenders part having 
contributed to lower aggregate lending (Jiménez et al., 2012; Puri et al., 2011).  
In as much as the decline in the lending trends has been observed to be associated with firm 
and lenders behaviours, Holton, Lawless, & McCann (2012) argued that, macroeconomic 
factors following the crisis led to changes in SME credit market. The authors performed a panel 
study on 24 000 SMEs across 11 economies during the period 2009 to 2010 and concluded that 
the economic growth rate as reflected by the real GDP, and the debt overhang on the part of the 
firms are the significant drivers of the demand for SME credit.  
The weaker the economy, the lower the demand for credit. Sovereign and financial factors 
reflected in sovereign bond yields and the median CDS spread respectively, affect the lenders 
funding positions (Holton et al., 2012). These were observed to impact negatively on SME 
credit supply. Thus, at SME financing level, weak macroeconomic factors can inhibit demand 
and supply of SME credit (Holton et al., 2012). 




Regulatory and legislative requirements discussed in Section 2.4 are only a component in the 
process of granting loans. Another critical step in credit assessment is to evaluate 
creditworthiness of applicants. The applications undergo credit scoring process where ratings 
are assigned to determine their ability to repay debt timely and in full. Credit scoring refers to 
customer creditworthiness rating and it forms the cornerstone of credit risk management. This 
is divided into two main pillars: the front end (acquisition) and the back end (existing customer). 
Front end deals with through the door customers where application scorecard contributes to 
credit lending decision process.  
Before issuance of loans, commercial banks assess applicants to determine their 
creditworthiness. The application scorecard becomes an important aspect for business 
acquisitions. Back end process uses behavioural scorecard to determine risk levels of existing 
customers and inform credit risk management and collection strategies. To enhance the 
acquisition process, an application scorecard is developed in this study. The quantitative 
analytics component of this study delves into the empirical customer application and 
performance data to determine the main risk drivers and establish factors that lead to loan 
application rejections.  Financial providers develop scorecards using historic data with an 
assumption that the historic trends are like future experiences. 
2.10 Statistical Approaches to Modelling Credit Risk 
 
Conventional statistical approaches were used to model risk in the past (Capon, 1982). Notably, 
the initial methodologies of significance, which gained popularity for being theoretically 
straightforward include linear regression and discriminant analysis. However, the data fell short 
in assumptions required for these approaches. Consumer credit data are often associated with 
non-constant variance, a condition known as heteroscedasticity because the response variable 
is normally binomial that indicates whether or not a loan or facility will default (Jilek, 2008). 
To curb inaccuracies associated with violation of principal linear regression assumptions, most 
financial institutions adopted a binary response variable type of regression known as logistic 
regression. The scoring function in logistic regression is the probability of default and this 













Where 𝑌𝑖 is the binary response variable, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of independent variables with their 
associated parameter estimates 𝛽𝑖 and 𝑒 is the natural logarithm. What makes logistic regression 
attractive is that the exponential function is always non-negative and the probability values are 
restricted within [0, 1] range (Lottes et al., 1996). Thus, this study employs logistic regression 
technique to build the application scorecard of SMEs. 
2.11 SME Application Scorecard Development  
During the mid-1990s, Fair Isaac and Company, a data analytics company based in California 
developed one of the first application scorecards bespoke to SMEs (Harvey, 2006). The author 
noted that this was adopted by most of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
banks to implement credit scoring for SMEs within their economies. The use of pooled data 
(where data comes from multiple lenders) in formulating SME scorecards proved to be a 
success in terms of cost effectiveness, improved bad debt management and regulatory 
compliance on the back of enhanced risk control in the developed world. On the other hand, the 
developing market still rely on: the use of proxies or benchmark scorecards whereby a scorecard 
developed for the retail/corporate credit market for instance can be applied to the SME credit 
market, expert judgements where the decision to accept or reject an application is based on 
experience, the use of financial statements and 5C’s of credit  which SMEs lack in most and 
can also be subjective (Caire, 2009). 
Drawing on learnings from the developed world, this study adopts a similar approach by 
developing an application scorecard bespoke to SMEs in an emerging market context but from 
a single money lending financial institution. For the purposes of this study, pooled data from 
different entities may not be accessible due to the bureaucratic nature of the businesses. 
However, since the institution in scope is one of the four leading banks in South Africa, the 
assumption is that similar trends are to be expected across the industry. The development of a 
scorecard tailor made for SMEs enables the lenders to quantify the risk associated with SME 
loan applicants, improves on objective decision-making processes and reduces transaction costs 
as seen in the developed world as highlighted in literature. 
2.12 Empirical Studies: SME Access to Finance 
 
Firm-financing gap is a term used to describe the inadequate access to finance faced by SMEs 




obstacle to the growth of firms as it inhibits innovation, research and development (Fowowe, 
2017). On 26 African countries examined, limited finance is the top SME growth inhibitors 
ahead of inadequate infrastructure, intermittent electricity supply, corruption, labour 
regulations and macroeconomic instability, among other factors (Gelb et al., 2007). In the 
Caribbean, lack of access to finance is the third highest inhibitor to SME growth (Dinh et al., 
2012) whereas this factor is ranked the highest in 38 Sub-Saharan countries sampled.  
Firm-financing gap is dominant due to severely disadvantaged financial system architecture in 
developing countries (Beck, 2013; Fowowe, 2017; Keskin et al., 2010). SMEs lack access to 
equity markets and it is often difficult for them to access public debt (Beck, 2013). This is a 
supply side problem also identified by Kamau (KAMAU, 2015) whose empirical research on 
Kenya’s SMEs pointed out the problem of financial exclusion and lack of sensitivity to SMEs 
by financial institutions. Empirical research by Thorsten Beck (Beck, 2007) in developing 
countries shows that weaknesses in financial systems, high levels of transaction costs, stringent 
regulatory framework and difficulties in risk management make commercial banks very 
reluctant to reach out to SMEs. The author recommended market friendly activist policies, 
government backed institutional building and more reasonable regulatory environment 
enabling banks to grant SME financing with ease.  
Haritone (Haritone, 2016) undertook a census of 43 commercial banking institutions in Kenya, 
implored their annual, audited financial reports over a period of 5 years (2010 - 2014). Using 
multiple linear regression, the author concluded that the bank size and liquidity status 
significantly impacted on lending capability to SMEs. Interest rates and credit risk played no 
significant role in SME credit lending. By implementing policies to grow commercial banks, 
lending to SMEs can be improved. On a similar note macroeconomic indicators such as 
financial deepening, commercial bank’s total assets, inflation, are contributing factors to the 
lack of SME funding in Nigeria (Adeyeye et al., 2016). Njeru Njue & Mbogo (Njeru Njue & 
Mbogo, 2017) sampled 17 of 46 commercial banks in Kenya and conducted in-depth research 
on SME access to commercial bank finance. The authors concluded that factors hindering SME 
access to finance include lack of creditworthiness information on small firms, low net worth of 
the applicants as reflected in their low value balance sheets, lack of collateral and information 
asymmetry. Essentially SMEs mostly failed to satisfy the 5Cs of credit (Collateral, Character, 




advancing financial literacy to applicants, development of credit scoring systems compliant to 
credit bureau regulations and improvement in truthfulness and honesty on the part of SMEs. 
 
Kira (Kira, 2013), based on their assessment on 164 SMES from Tanzania, argues that SME 
management’s education, firm’s location, industry, size of business, incorporation, age and 
collateral availability are some of the noticeable factors affecting access to funding. The author 
recommends firm managers to acquire business skills to enable them to adjust to financial 
institutions requirements for funding. Further, they made some recommendations to the 
government to create a suitable environment for SMEs to operate through strategic planning, 
training, education and implementation of SME support sector. 
 
Binswanger & van den Brink (2005) conducted a detailed research in the agricultural sector 
SME financing in Africa and identified the main problems faced by the lenders as: seasonality 
in the agricultural chain from farming to market, covariant risks (common shocks due to 
weather patterns, pest infection or prices), information asymmetry, arising from the differences 
between the quality and quantity of information shared among stakeholders, moral hazards 
occurring when the funding is not utilised for its intended purpose and political pressure 
enforcing lenders to restructure or forgive agricultural debts. Levy (1993), on the back of their 
field surveys in Tanzania's furniture industry, identified SME growth inhibiting factors arising 
from the comprehensive enforcement of regulatory and tax policies and the bureaucratic burden 
of negotiating with the government. Even adequately sized and experienced firms faced the 
same predicament but with less difficulties than SMEs.    
 
A study on Latin American firms showed that internal factors such as firm size, technological 
advancements and formality are the most important affecting the ability of SMEs to access 
finance (Alberto & Peñaloza, 2015). These factors play a crucial role in harnessing the 
competitive advantage of the firms resulting in improved cash flows and other aspects 
motivating commercial lenders to grant loans. Commercial banks’ loan officers in Spain argue 
that the firm’s audited financial reports results in better willingness of the lenders to grant them 
credit (Palazuelos & Crespo, 2017). Coupled with the general perception of audited reports was 





The SME sector in South Africa is dominated by slow growth businesses and a lack of funding 
is the major constraint towards further development (Mutezo, 2015). Some businesses die at 
infancy due to lack of financial support. In fact, commercial banks are sceptical to fund SMEs 
due to their specialised mandate. Owing to the intensely diversified and opaque nature of SMEs, 
a huge number of credit applications are turned down because of their inability to satisfy NCA 
and FICA requirements. These regulations are observed to be the major hindrances to access 
commercial funding by SMEs ahead of behavioural and risk assessment attributes (Beck et al., 
2008). On the other hand, Mutezo (2015) argues that technological divide, information 
asymmetry and failure to meet regulatory requirements are the major reasons commercial banks 
reject SME applications for funding. 
2.13 Summary 
This Chapter reviewed the importance of SMEs, successes and pitfalls experienced in this 
sector, particularly in the context of SME credit landscape, from both the demand and supply 
perspective. Globally, SMEs are touted as engines of economic growth. They span a wide 
spectrum of economic sectors and are inclined to foster innovative entrepreneurship and gratify 
a variety of socio-economic objectives such as poverty alleviation, generation of income, 
employment creation, economic growth and reduction in societal inequalities. These economic 
sectors include agriculture, mining, construction, trade, transport, communication and 
manufacturing, among others. SME output accounts for a sizeable portion of the GDP 
depending on the global classification of the economy.   
In South Africa, SME sector is supported by its government through an array of agencies was 
established to facilitate, promote and develop small enterprises. These include, but not limited 
to SEDA, SEFA, SAMAF and NYDA, among others. Despite the unmerited government 
intervention on this part of the globe, SME growth has been hampered by lack of access to 
commercial funding. Start-ups and informal businesses form the greatest proportion of SMEs 
in the country and lenders are less likely to grant them loans due lack of credit history and 
information asymmetry. Studies show that SMEs in Gauteng are more likely to get funding 
compared the predominantly rural Mpumalanga and Northern Cape due to a lack of access to 
physical infrastructure and widening technological divide. Skills shortage, permit delays and 




From the supply side of the SME credit landscape in South Africa, the Chapter explored the 
theoretical credit scoring techniques supported by the empirical literature. Potential drivers of 
lack of SME funding were discussed based on previous studies. This section further discussed 
application scorecard development and the statistical approaches to modelling credit risk, in 






CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This study seeks to identify macroprudential indicators and macroeconomic factors influencing 
the demand and supply of credit in the South African SME sector. The investigation made use 
of information obtained from one of the leading commercial banking institutions in South 
Africa. Using the dataset in scope, an empirical evaluation was conducted through exploratory 
data analysis and statistical inference. Quantitative approaches were used to determine the 
drivers of risk and SME behaviours leading to default. This Chapter discusses the 
methodologies in detail. 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
 
Research data was obtained from one of the leading banks in South Africa. From the main data 
warehouse, the application, behavioural and performance information on SMEs were extracted 
and insights were drawn from the empirical data. Bureau data, macroeconomic information and 
credit industry data were sourced from the external institutions, Experian and Moody’s, for 
each month in observation.  
 
3.3 Population, Sampling Approach and Sample Size 
 
This study considered all application information available on SME applicants within the 
overdraft facility over a seven-year period from July 2012 to July 2019. For the purposes of 
time series analysis, this study considered each month in observation, totalling 85 data points. 
At each point, volumes of applications received were flagged as the demand of credit whereas 
the size of the approved loans reflected the supply of credit by the lender. The actual figures 
corresponding to these trends are provided in Chapter Four. 
 
For the SME application scorecard model development, cohorts of applications received in each 
month in observation were tracked to determine the behaviour of applicants over time. The 
sample size was determined by the total number of OD applications submitted to the bank by 
SME applicants during the seven-year period specified above. The actual numbers in each 




3.4  Demand and Supply of SME Credit 
 
Demand for credit was determined as the volume/number of applications received from SMEs 
while supply of credit is the acceptance rate (accepted applications/total applications) of the 
applications in each month. The macroeconomic indicators are economic growth (GDP) and 
prime lending rate (PLR) while the macroprudential indicators; overdrafts and loans (OL); 
disposable household income (DHI), debt service ratio (DSR) and credit extended to 
households (CEH) were employed as control variables. The relationship between and 
macroprudential indicators, macroeconomic factors, demand and supply of SME credit is 
depicted by the time series linear regression as; 
 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐸𝐻𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  ……….1 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐸𝐻𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  ……….2 
 
where 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡  and 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 denotes monthly aggregate demand and supply of credit by SMEs and 
t is time in months. The measurement and description of the variables in demand and supply of 
credit equations are presented in Table 4. 
 




Annual (year on year) growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on the local 
currency. “GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products”, 
(World Bank Group, 2018).  
Prime Lending Rate (PLR) Actual PLR values representing the lending rate expected to meet the short needs of 
businesses. PLR can be defined based on the objectives of financing and creditworthiness 
of borrowers. 
Macroprudential Indicators 
Debt Service Ratio (DSR) Debt service amount as a fraction of total debt. “Total debt service is the summation of 
principal repayments and interest paid in currency, goods, or services” (The World Bank, 
2018). 
Overdrafts and Loans (OL) Annual growth rate of credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations 
through overdraft facilities and other loan types such as term loans, vehicle finance, credit 






Year on year growth rate. DHI Measures total net income received by households through 
wages, salaries and enterprises among other income streams after considering taxes and 
other contributions. 
Credit Extended to 
Households 
(CEH) 
Annual growth rate of credit provided to households by financial corporations through the 
retail lending facilities such as personal loans, term loans, revolving facilities, clothing and 
instalment debt, among other loan types. 
 
 
3.5  Time Series Diagnostics 
3.5.1 Unit Root Analysis 
 
The time series regression analysis is based on the stationarity assumption of the series of 
macroeconomic factors and macroprudential indicators considered in this study. Non 
stationarity in the input series leads to spurious ordinary least squares (OLS) outcome, hence 
the need to test for stationarity in each of the variables in scope. Required is the determination 
of order of integration that achieves stationarity of each of the variable. This can be attained by 
unit root testing of the respective series. Non stationarity implies the existence of unit root. In 
this study, the Augmented Dicky Fuller [ADF] test was used to test for stationarity and 
determine the order of integration. It involves estimation of the following regression equation 
[with intercept and trend]. Differentials and time lags are added until stationarity is achieved 
(Dufour & Renault, 2019). 
 
For time series 𝑋; 
∆𝑋𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑡 + 𝑎2∆𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑎3∆𝑋𝑡−3 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛∆𝑋𝑡−𝑛 
 
Where 𝑋𝑡  is the series of a macroeconomic indicator at time 𝑡 and ∆ indicates the differencing 
operator. The null hypothesis suggests the existence of a unit root while the alternative 
hypothesis represents stationarity. 
 
3.5.2 Cointegration Analysis 
 
Following on the stationarity tests, if integration of at least order one is observed in the 
macroeconomic indicators, it is imperative to establish whether there exists a linear 
combination of the series of interest, exhibiting stationarity in levels and differentials of the 




one (I(1)). This warrants the use of the Johansen’s cointegration test to establish the existence 
of cointegration among the series in scope or the absence thereof. This test is suitable for use 
when the series of interest are integrated of the same order (Malik & Velan, 2019; Tiwari, 2012; 
Wickremasinghe, 2011). The Johansen test provides estimates of all possible cointegrating 
vectors through transformation of data into eigenvalues. The null hypothesis suggests no 
cointegration and the alternative relates to the existence of cointegration. The presence of 
cointegration indicates long run relationship which implies the existence of a short run 
disequilibrium. This can be corrected in the long run through a vector autocorrection term 
(Malik & Velan, 2019). 
 
The Johansen cointegration test indicated no cointegration of the series in scope in this study. 
As such, the unrestricted Vector Autoregression (VAR) model was therefore used to establish 
the linear interdependencies among the multiple time series and their differentials. VAR is a 
stochastic process that generalises the univariate autoregressive model to a vector of 
macroeconomic series (Chowdhury, 1986; Markku & Pentti, 2013). This was performed for 
both demand and supply aspects of the analysis. The results are provided in Chapter Four.  
 
3.6 SME Application Scorecard 
 
The relevant information was extracted from the data warehouse of the institution in scope. 
This entails information on SMEs who submitted applications during the observation period 
for an overdraft facility in scope. The raw dataset consists of standard variables which cannot 
be modelled on but are crucial as identifiers and important indicators for the purposes of 
segmentation. Standard variables include, inter alia, ID number, observation month and account 
number. Sensitive information such as ID number and account number were masked to comply 
with issues of confidentiality in the business environment. Table 5 shows a sample of variables 
considered standard in this study, their description and usage. 
 
Table 5: Standard Variables 
Variable Description Usage 
ID Number 
(masked) 
Unique identifier of the principal 
account holder  
Age of the principal account holder can be 
derived from this variable. 
Account Number (masked) Unique identifier of the loan facility To link performance tables and track the 




Month Month of loan application Segmentation and analysis by application 
cohorts 
Reason for rejection An indicator with code, stating the 
reason for rejection for all applicants 
failing to meet the loan granting 
criteria.  
To determine the volumes of accounts 
rejected due to regulatory requirements as a 
percentage of total applications 
 
 
3.6.1 Measuring Default Status 
 
The South African banking industry adheres to the international banking regulations 
recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) through the Basel 
Accords. For the local banks to sustain adequate capital reserves, the Basel Accords are 
enforced by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) to ensure sustainability in the event of 
economic strain. This study therefore follows the default definition as defined in the Basel 
Accords (Bank for International Settlements, 2012) as follows: 
 
“A default is considered to have occurred regarding a particular borrower when either or both 
of the two following events have taken place.  
 The bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to repay his/her credit obligations to the 
bank in full.  
 The obligor is more than 90 days past the due date on any credit obligation to the 
banking group.” 
This definition of default was be used to derive the default status, the dependent or response 
variable in the application scorecard model building process.  
 
3.6.2 Outcome Period Analysis 
 
When employing the binary target logistic regression statistical approach, sufficient time is 
sought to track performance of loans between the loan activation point to the point of default. 
The performance or outcome period is determined on a cohort basis. Using the full information 
provided on the commercial lenders’ portfolio, the loan repayment behaviour of cohorts or a 
set of customers whose applications were approved and activated in the same month were 
tracked. This is done to determine the average amount of time it takes for the customers who 
eventually default to realise the event. This period is referred to as the performance period or 




model to current experience whilst ensuring adequate observations to be made for development 
to enhance stability of parameters.  In practise, the performance period is normally set between 
12 to 24 months (Siddiqi, 2006), depending on the structure of the data. An empirical analysis 
was conducted in this study to determine the performance period which suits the data in scope.  
 
The default definition described in Section 3.6.1 was used to identify and reflect the difference 
between good and bad cases. The “bad” and “good” categories refer to whether a credit default 
event occurs or not, respectively, over the performance window. Using the historical 
subpopulation of the accepts, cohorts of applications were tracked from the application month 
over various periods to capture the volumes of the good and the badly performing accounts at 
each horizon. The forecasting horizon is consistent with the Basel Accords, which explicitly 
requires financial institutions to use longer time horizons (in excess of 12 months) in rating 
assessments (BCBS, 2017). Figure 4  shows the trend at 6 months horizon intervals from 12 to 
24 months. It is imperative to determine the outcome period with a view to maintain relevancy 
of the model to current experience whilst ensuring a enough observations for the stability of the 
input variables. As expected, the default rate (bad rate) increases with an increase in the horizon. 
It can be observed that most defaults occurred in January 2013 and October 2016 cohorts 
consistently across horizons. 
 
Figure 4: Outcome Period Analysis 
 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
Based on the trends provided in Figure 4 and the corresponding summary statistics in Table 6, 




















and reactiveness of the model. Table 6 indicates the number of bad accounts for different 
outcome periods on the entire SME Overdraft portfolio over the observation period. The 12 
months horizon is the most stable but with the lowest number of bads which may lead to a low 
statistical significance of the model. The 18 months horizon has more bads with a lower 
standard deviation than the 24 months outcome. Even though the 24 months horizon has the 
most bads, the period maybe too long to observe performance and relevancy is likely to be lost. 
For these reasons, an 18 months outcome period was chosen. 
 
Table 6: Outcome Period Analysis 
Time on book 
(Horizon) 
Total number of 
Applications 






12 months 43,428 891 2.13% 0.00822 
18 months 41,007 1,701 4.25% 0.01001 
24 months 38,632 2,521 6.70% 0.01307 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
3.6.3 Definition of Variables 
 
Independent variables were extracted from the application tables found on the data warehouse. 
For the previously accepted applications, the repayment behaviour was tracked in order to 
establish a link between application variables and default. Additional variables were derived 
from the readily available raw data if they were deemed to be predictive of loan performance. 
Potential risk drivers and other behavioural variables which can be used as predictors of risk 
are in Table 7. Some are raw variables extracted from the data warehouse and some are derived. 
 
Table 7: Potential Risk Drivers 
Variable  Description Rationale for Consideration 
Default Status  A derived binary target variable 
indicating whether an account defaulted 
within the outcome period 
Binary target variable 
Time since last transaction 
 
The time that has elapsed (in months) 
since the applicants’ last credit 
transaction on their main account with 
the lender 
The higher the number of months since an 
applicant’s last credit transaction, the 
greater the likelihood of the applicant not 
having sufficient funds to meet debt 







The industry under which the applicant 
operates is indicated by this variable 
Certain industries tend to be riskier than 
others and will be allocated comparatively 
lower scorecard points. 
Number of Credit Enquiries 
 
The number of enquiries made by the 
principal business owner in the last 12 
months  
Applicants who have made a large number 
of enquiries in a short period are considered 
risky and will be allocated low scorecard 
points. 
Time since payment profile 
 
The time that has elapsed (in days) since 
the principal business owner opened a 
payment profile  
Applicants who acquired their latest 
payment profile further in the past tend to 
be less risk than those who have acquired it 
more recently. 
Worst Arrears Recent 
 
The Worst Arrears in the Last 6 Months 
by the principal business owner 
The worse the arrears level in the past 6 
months the greater the risk of default and 
the lower the scorecard points to be 
allocated 
Worst Arrears Ever 
 
This variable reflects the worst arrears 
level in the entire credit history of the 
principal business owner. 
The worse the arrears levels in the principal 
business owner’s credit history, the greater 
the risk of default and thus, the lower 
scorecard points to be allocated. 
Guinness Rating 
 
This variable is based on a set of matrices 
including Turnover, Time with the lender 
and time in business. 
Applicants who have a low Guinness 
Rating tend to have a high default risk and 
will be allocated low scorecard points. 
Time with Lender 
 
The period of time (in months) an 
applicant has been a client of the lender   
Applicants who have been the lender’s 
clients for a longer time period are 
perceived to have a low default risk. 
Excess 
 
Business Entity Excess Indicator 
 
Business entities which have never been in 
excess are perceived to have a low default 




Principal business owner Worst Excess Principal business owners who have never 
been in excess are perceived to have a low 




This variable represents the principal 
business owner’s worst credit bureau 
report 
The worse the principal’s credit bureau 
report, the higher the risk of default and 
thus, the lower the scorecard points to be 
allocated. 
 
These variables were explored to derive insights and structure of SMEs who seek commercial 




is expected that the loan requirement arises due to the need to cater for increases in operational 
costs and to improve growth of businesses.  
 
Every variable eligible for use in modelling needs to be assessed for validity, authenticity and 
relevance within context. For each variable the proportion of the missing values needs to be 
less than or equal to 15 percent unless the missingness can be motivated by reasonable 
arguments (Marimo & Chimedza, 2017). In a typical consumer credit data set, ordinal, 
continuous and nominal variables exist. For the purpose of scorecard development, often only 
the grouped predictor variables are required. As such, variables should be converted to a 
numerical interval dummy variable. The levels of the interval variables, or groups are assigned 
according to distinct levels of risk as defined by the event rate or default rate in this case. This 
is done per group for each variable under consideration. The bins should produce a monotonic 
and intuitive event rate curve for a rank ordered variable. The direction of the event rate should 
make business and statistical sense. 
 
3.6.4 Population Flow 
 
A waterfall of the applications was created to reflect the total number of applications received 
by the lender over the seven-year period, the exclusions of entries not eligible for the scorecard 
model development and the final numbers were considered in the analysis. The process entails 
detailed breakdown of applications approved by the lender as well as the rejects, volumes of 
loans taken up by SMEs and non-taken up.  This study considers applications only up to January 
2018 to allow for at least 18 months (February 2018 to July 2019) performance of the loans. 
Figure 5 shows the population flow of SME loan applications and how the data was prepared 
for the scorecard model development. 
 
Of the 73,247 approved applications, 44.29 percent were not taken up by the SMEs. This is 
mainly due to the cold scoring technique used by the lender to grow the business. Cold scoring 
is a process whereby potential clients are identified using propensity models and other internal 
processes and their applications are generated by the lender on behalf of the customers. It is the 
prerogative of the SMEs to take up or decline the offer. The statistics herein show that almost 
half of the applicants do not take up on this offer probably because they do not need the credit 
facility offered at the time.  On average, about 3.85 percent of SMEs default on loans within 




Figure 5: Population Flow 
 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
3.6.5 Sample Design 
 
For the application scorecard model development and testing, the study considered all 
applications received from July 2012 and January 2018 with performance period of 18 months 
from February 2018 to July 2019. This was segmented into Accepts and Rejects as recorded in 
Figure 5. Using this segmentation, the data was sampled into the Development data set and 
Validation data set using a ratio of 80:20 respectively (Marimo & Chimedza, 2017). Table 8 
shows the observations allocated in each case. 
 
Table 8: Sample Design 









Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
SME Overdraft Total 
Applications
July 2012 to July 2019
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SME Overdraft Total 
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% of Population: 54.71%
Goods
39,236
% of Population: 96.15%
Bads
1,572
% of Population: 3.85%
Not Taken Up
32,439







3.6.6  Logistic Regression 
 
The lending criteria in OD is largely depended on customer attributes such as the business 
sector in which the customer operates, its size, growth stage, affordability and creditworthiness 
as defined by the scorecard rating. The variables consist of demographics, customer 
relationships with the bank and external information such as credit bureau data. A performance 
period was driven by the data for use in the determination of the default event which will be 
modelled using logistic regression as follows: 
 
𝑝(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)  =  
𝑒−𝛽0 + 𝛽1×𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 +𝛽2×𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 +⋯+𝛽𝑛×𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 
1 +  𝑒−𝛽0  + 𝛽1×𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 +𝛽2×𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 +⋯+𝛽𝑛×𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑒 
 
 
The above logistic regression model was fitted with an expectation to produce: 
 the main drivers of default 
 a probability model to be applied at the point of application 
 a tool used to translate into scorecard points, depending on probability levels, that is, 
the application scorecard. 
 
3.6.7 Reject Inference 
 
To achieve stability and robustness of the estimates, as well as to avoid bias in the scorecard, 
the application scorecard should consider all applications received by the lender within the 
outcome period, regardless of whether the application was accepted or rejected. However, the 
performance information is only available on the accepted and taken-up applications only.  If 
the objective is to measure the impact of the scorecard on all applications, there is need to assign 
an ‘inferred’ performance to the rejected applications in the development sample. Reject 
inference is thus a process whereby the performance of the rejected applications is inferred or 
estimated.  Further, it is important to note that not all approved loans get taken-up. To mitigate 
this complication, the reject inference is applied in two stages as follows: 
1. Assign each reject a probability of taken-up if rendered accepted.  
2. Assign each reject a probability of good if estimated to be a Taken-Up (TU).  
3.6.8 Goodness of Fit Statistics 
 
The Wald test is a statistical analysis tool used to test that the null hypothesis that all regression 




evidence, at global level that at least one of the regression coefficients for a predictor variable 
is different from zero (Kyngäs, H. and Rissanen, 2001). This test will be employed in the study 
and conclusions related to the significance of the combinations of independent variables will 
be made.  
 
Various combinations of independent variables will be assessed and compared using goodness 
of fit measures. The -2 Log Likelihood statistic (-2 LOG L), the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) are some of the commonly used goodness of 
fit approaches. The AIC and the SBC adjust the -2 LOG L for the number of terms and 
observations in the model. The SBC considers the number of variables and the size of the 
sample AIC uses the number of variables only. The SBC is more severe and it favours more 
parsimonious models.  The lower values of AIC or SBC indicate more desirable models.  
 
3.6.9 Gini Statistics 
 
The Gini Statistic (GS) is a measure of strength of a single independent variable against the 
dependent variable when used in the model as a single input. The GS is also known as Somers’ 
D statistic. It measures uniformity of a distribution and determines its ability to differentiate 
risk. The less uniformly distributed the variable is, the greater its capability to differentiate risk 
(Jilek, 2008). Suppose an interval variable with m levels or groups is being assessed for GS in 
a dataset of N observations, the groups are organized in the increasing order of their event rates. 
For every group, the number of events is given by 𝑛𝑖
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡  and the non-event by 𝑛𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 . The 
total number of events = 𝑁𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 and the corresponding non-events = 𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 , the GS is 
determined as follows (Laerd Statistics, 2016): 
 
𝐺𝑆 =  (1 −
2 × ∑ (𝑛𝑖
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×  ∑ 𝑛𝑗
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖−1





𝑁𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×  𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
) × 100 
 
In addition, the variables are checked for population stability over time. For a categorical 
variable to be useful, there should be a consistent size or volume of entries at each level or 
group over time. Input or independent variables are expected to make business sense. In 






3.6.10  Weight of Evidence 
 
The Weight of Evidence (WoE) is a measure of the strength of each variable in differentiating 
the bad and good cases and is given by: 




Where 𝑙𝑛 is the natural logarithm of the returned value, 𝑔𝑖 represents the proportion of good 
accounts in group 𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 represents the proportion of bad accounts in group 𝑖 of the same 
variable. The WoE can be positive or negative. Positive WoE implies that the variable isolates 
a bigger fraction of good cases than bads and the converse is true for negative WoE. The larger 
the difference of the WoE between groups, the higher the predictive power of the variable. In 
addition, it is expected to have a monotonic trend in the WoE of predictor variable before the 
variable can be included in the model. The use of WoE transformation as input values for the 
model development offers a way to deal with differing input units (numeric and categorical).  
 
Independent variables passing the univariate process are considered jointly in selecting a 
candidate model through stepwise regression analysis. The results usually complement the 
correlation analysis where one on one correlation coefficient of predictor variables is computed.  
Whilst several variations exist, the multivariate selection process to be used in this study is the 
stepwise regression. The study made use of the forward selection criteria. The process starts 
with an empty model, computes a chi-square statistic for each covariate not in the model and 
selects the one with the largest value. If the covariate meets the significance criteria, then it is 
added to the model. The process is repeated until none of the remaining variables meets the 
specified level of entry (Melfi, 2004).  The reason why forward selection is preferred over other 
selection techniques such as backward selection has to do with the fact that the baseline of the 
logistic regression model diminishes with every added variable. A baseline with low volume 
will introduce larger error into the model which may impact the accuracy of the statistics 
calculated for variable inclusion. Thus, it is preferred to start with no variables and a well-
populated baseline when fitting the logistic regression model. 
 
3.6.11 ROC Curve 
 
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve or Lorenz curve plots sensitivity against 
1-specificity of each of the models to be compared. The plot is run at different cutoff values of 




is a fraction of accounts in default that the model correctly identifies as defaulted. Specificity 
refers to a fraction of accounts not in default that the model correctly identifies as not in 
default”, (Marimo & Chimedza, 2017). The horizontal axis represents 1- specificity while 
sensitivity is plotted on the vertical axis. The diagonal line on the plot represent a random or 
useless model.  A good model with the ability to differentiate risk lies at the uppermost left part 
of the ROC cartesian plane. The Area Under the ROC Curves (AUC) also explains the ability 
of the models to separate the good and bad cases. The higher the AUC value, the better the 
model. ROC approach was used herein to compare models including and excluding the bureau 





This Chapter highlighted the data sources, the sampling design and the methodologies to be 
followed in this investigation. The relationship between demand/supply of SME credit and 
economic growth is of key importance. The technical details of developing an application 
scorecard entails historic data extraction, exploratory data analysis, data cleaning, univariate 
and multivariate data analyses. SME application for overdraft facility data are provided over a 
seven-year period from July 2012 to July 2019. Outcome period analysis offers sufficient 
workout observation on all applications and helps remove biasness in the model. The analytical 
framework and theoretical view on the use of a binary target logistic regression methodology 
was discussed in this Chapter. Goodness of fit statistics are global model diagnostic tests 





CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
4.1   Introduction  
This chapter details the in-depth analysis of the SME credit patterns and the development of an 
application scorecard using the credit scoring methodology developed by Siddiqi (Siddiqi, 
2006). The analysis is set out to reflect the SME credit industry in accordance with trends in 
the domestic, economic, financial and legislative environment. The statistical analysis was 
conducted in SAS® Enterprise Guide, summarised in Microsoft (MS) Excel and reported in 
MS Word. 
  
4.2   Exploratory Data Analysis 
This section describes the structure of the available data. From 278,886 applications received 
over the seven-year period, July 2012 to July 2019, the lender declined a substantial 198,678 
applications, making up 71.2% of the total. The term “rejects” refers to the subpopulation of 
loan applications the lender declines due to various reasons. These include failure to meet the 
acceptance cut-off score by the existing scorecard, failure to comply with credit policy rules 
under the NCA or manual overrides driven by acquisitions criteria and the lender’s risk appetite. 
It can be observed from Figure 6 that the volumes of applications (demand) received per month 
significantly plummeted from an average of 4000 prior to 201507 to 2000 in the latest period. 
The number of rejects is consistently higher than the accepted applications (supply). The 
application process is seasonal or cyclical as the volumes sizeably drop in January each year. 
The patterns reflecting the demand and supply of SME credit may be driven by changes in the 
economy. An investigation was conducted using the available the macroeconomic indicators 
and the analysis is detailed in Section 4.3 
Figure 6: SME Applications over Time 
 

















Table 9: Summary Statistics for SME Loan Applications 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Total Number of Applications 3273 1271 1205 5958 
Accepts (rate) 943 (29%) 658 233 2530 
Rejects (rate) 2330 (71%) 715 972 4099 
Source: Estimates from Research Data, 2019 
The summary statistics of the volume of applications, accepts and rejects observed over a period 
85 months are provided in Table 9. The maximum number of applications were received in July 
2014. In the same month, the highest number of accepts were observed. The least figures in 
both instances were observed in December 2018. It is interesting to investigate how these trends 
complement activities in the economy and the financial environment through the movements 
in macroeconomic factors and macroprudential indicators. 
 
4.3 Time Series Analysis 
For each month in observation, the acceptance rate (supply) is the total number of accepts 
divided by the total number of applications received for the month. The macroeconomic factors 
as well as the macroprudential indicators were sourced from Moody’s rating agency. Variables 
listed in Table 4 were considered relevant to the risk inherent in SME credit industry and were 
assessed as potential economic drivers of SME credit patterns. 
 
The time series plot of the acceptance rate and each of these variables is shown in Figure 7. The 
acceptance rate follows similar trend to Overdraft and Loans (OL). The year on year OL rate 
has declined drastically overtime reflecting the worsening credit extension in the financial 
industry. The drop in the acceptance rate during the last quarter of 2015 aligns to an increase in 
the prime lending rate which translated into high borrowing costs, making it difficult for the 
firms to submit applications for commercial bank funding and for lenders to extend loans. The 
acceptance rate pattern is intuitive to the movements in PLR. 
 
For these potential drivers, a sensibility test was devised to assess whether the correlations of 
these indicators are in line with logical expectations. For example, it is expected that the 
acceptance rate would increase as the GDP increases, giving a positive correlation between the 











Notes: GDP= Gross Domestic Product; Prime=Prime Lending Rate; DSR = Debt Service Ratio; DHI Disposable 
household Income; OL= Overdrafts and Loans; CEH = Credit Extended to Households; AR = Acceptance Rate 
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GDP +45.84% Pass 23.36 
Prime -74.81% Pass 36.16 
DSR -34.92 Fail N/A 
OL +75.65% Pass 47.62 
DHI -55.61% Fail N/A 
CEH +43.65 Pass 33.17 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
4.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
The time series diagnostics delved into intricacies of stationarity and cointegration embedded 
in macroeconomic variables and macroprudential indicators ahead of the regression analysis. 
Unit root tests were performed using the ADF procedure on intercepts and trends of individual 
variables. The null hypothesis indicates the presence of unit root. Using the SBC criteria, the 
analysis was performed on the level and first lag length (lag = 1) for all series. Based on the 
results provided in Table 11, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root 
in levels for Prime and CEH and conclude that both variables are integrated of the first order. 
We reject the existence of unit root null hypothesis in both variables when the first difference 
is considered. This implies that the two variable exhibit stationarity only on first difference. 
The unit root hypothesis is rejected for GDP and OL in both level and first differential implying 
that the two series exhibit stationarity. As shown in Table 11, all the series are stationary at first 
difference. Thus, for cointegration purposes, it was decided to use the Johansen test. This was 
done separately for the demand and supply variations of the study. The results are provided in 
the ensuing sections. 
 
Table 11: Unit Root Test 
 Unit Root Tests 
 Level First Difference 
 Fisher ADF P-value Fisher ADF P-value 
GDP 7.380 0.027 9.730 0.001 
OL 14.120 0.001 19.620 0.001 
PLR 2.490 0.682 7.280 0.029 
CEH 5.270 0.139 18.200 0.001 
AR 2.337 0.021 6.995 0.004 
Volume 3.447 0.038 17.729 0.000 






4.3.2 Determinants of Demand for Credit 
 
Table 12: Cointegration Test: Demand for Credit 
Hypothesis Test of the Restriction 
Rank Eigenvalue 
Restricted 
Eigenvalue DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
0 0.2449 0.2450 5 3.40 0.6380 
1 0.2080 0.2147 4 3.39 0.4952 
2 0.1332 0.1398 3 2.68 0.4443 
3 0.1035 0.1244 2 2.04 0.3614 
4 0.0641 0.0649 1 0.08 0.7838 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
The Johansen Cointegration test indicates no cointegration at the 5% level, therefore the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model was performed and the results are provided in Table 13. Model 
diagnostics metrics are satisfactory with an 𝑅2 of 71.46% and a significant global F-test. 
 
Table 13: Demand for Credit VAR Model 
Volume - Model Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-Value Pr > |t| 
CONSTANT 3.32694 2.52804 1.32 0.1923 
𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆(𝒕−𝟏) 0.63973*** 0.11437 5.59 0.0001 
𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟏 0.06859 0.55176 0.12 0.9014 
𝑶𝑳𝒕−𝟏 -0.08421 0.05174 -1.63 0.1080 
𝑪𝑬𝑯𝒕−𝟏 1.16715* 0.66481 1.76 0.0834 
𝑷𝑳𝑹𝒕−𝟏 1.34007 4.50970 0.30 0.7672 
𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒕−𝟐 0.01264 0.11575 0.11 0.9133 
𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟐 0.01298 0.55358 0.02 0.9814 
𝑶𝑳𝒕−𝟐 0.09444* 0.05427 1.74 0.0861 
𝑪𝑬𝑯𝒕−𝟐 -1.19658* 0.68489 -1.75 0.0849 
𝑷𝑳𝑹𝒕−𝟐 -1.67639 4.32279 -0.39 0.6993 
R-Square 0.7146    
F-test 18.03    
Pr > |F| <.0001    
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
Note: ***, **, and * denote that the parameter estimate is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Results from the VAR analysis show that, the volume of loan applications and CEH at their 




credit. The positive value in estimates indicate that the higher the factor, the higher the demand 
for credit at the point of observation. The converse applies for the negative estimates such as 
the second lag in CEH.  
 
4.3.3 Determinants of Credit Supply 
 
Table 14: Cointegration Test: Credit Supply 
Hypothesis Test of the Restriction 
Rank Eigenvalue 
Restricted 
Eigenvalue DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
0 0.2384 0.2397 5 3.63 0.6040 
1 0.1711 0.1770 4 3.48 0.4804 
2 0.1468 0.1532 3 2.89 0.4085 
3 0.0845 0.1040 2 2.27 0.3220 
4 0.0616 0.0669 1 0.47 0.4908 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
The Johansen Cointegration test indicates no cointegration at the 5% level, therefore, the VAR 
model was performed, and the results are provided in Table 15. Model diagnostics metrics are 
satisfactory with an 𝑅2 of 93.47% and a significant global F-test at 5% level of significance. 
Table 15: Credit Supply VAR Model 
Acceptance Rate - Model Parameter Estimates 
Variable Estimate Std. Error tValue Pr > |t| 
CONSTANT 0.05378 0.80321 0.07 0.9468 
𝑨𝑹𝒕−𝟏 1.03392*** 0.11399 9.07 0.0001 
𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟏 -0.34369 0.26935 -1.28 0.2061 
𝑶𝑳𝒕−𝟏 -0.05110 0.18027 -0.28 0.7776 
𝑪𝑬𝑯𝒕−𝟏 0.26911 0.25192 1.07 0.2890 
𝑷𝑳𝑹𝒕−𝟏 -0.07142 2.09168 -0.03 0.9729 
𝑨𝑹𝒕−𝟐 -0.24689** 0.11552 -2.14 0.0360 
𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟐 0.36090 0.27128 1.33 0.1876 
𝑶𝑳𝒕−𝟐 0.19490 0.17556 1.11 0.2706 
𝑪𝑬𝑯𝒕−𝟐 -0.38657 0.25879 -1.49 0.1396 
𝑷𝑳𝑹𝒕−𝟐 -0.13788 2.11101 -0.07 0.9481 
R-Square 0.9347    
F-test 103.13    
Pr > |F| <.0001    
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 




The major determinants driving the acceptance rate of SME loan applications are the acceptance 
rate at first and second lags of the time series. It is highly likely for the loans to be approved if 
the acceptance rate was higher in the previous month and the converse is true for the two-month 
lag. It is important to note the recursive parameterization shortcoming of the VAR methodology 
(Onoja et al., 2017)  as the prediction can be estimated from the same variable as is the case in 
the prediction of the acceptance rate. The additional multiple interdependencies of variables are 




4.4   Application Scorecard Model Development 
 
The application scorecard can be used to decide whether to extend credit to applicants with an 
aim to reduce defaults and serious delinquencies on new applicants. In addition, the model can 
also be used to allocate capital, determine risk tendency and monitor the performance of the 
portfolio in scope. Risk characteristics under Basel Accords should be calculated and used in 
conjunction with the scorecard for risk management purposes (BCBS, 2017).  
 
4.4.1 Reject Inference 
 
 Stage 1: Infer Non-Taken Up Applications 
 
The first stage in reject inference is to assign the Non-Taken-Up (NTU) records within the 
rejected population. All the accepted applications from the development sample were used to 
infer the TU and NTU probabilities to the rejected records. The application score of the 
principal business owner was used as a proxy for the credit performance of each SME across 
its loans. This score was used to fit a relationship between TU and NTU applications. As shown 
in Figure 8, an inverse relationship is observed between the application score and the TU rate 
where a higher score results in a lower TU rate. 
  
Figure 8: Take Up Rate Model 
 




























































































Take Up Rate Model




This relationship is intuitive because if offered a loan, the worse performing applicants (lower 
score) are likely to take up on the offer compared to the low risk (high score) applicants. 
 
 Stage 2: Infer Reject Good and Bad Applications 
The second stage in reject inference is to assign the probability of good to rejects if estimated 
to have taken up the loan. This is based on the Known Good Bad (KGB) model built on the 
subpopulation with known performance (accepted and taken up). The model is based on fitting 
the application score at outcome point to obtain a relationship between good and bad accounts.  
The purpose is to predict the probability of TU account being good or bad at outcome. Logistic 
regression was applied to develop the KGB model. Figure 9 shows the prediction of the KGB 
model on rejects and accepts. The trend is intuitive as the probability of good is consistently 
lower for the reject population. With the reject inference completed, the application scorecard 
can be developed on a full spectrum of applications received by the lender. 
 
Figure 9: KGB Model Prediction 
 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
4.4.2 Reject Inference Validity 
 
In application scorecard development, the Good: Bad odds ratio for accepts and inferred rejects 
usually falls in the range of 2 to 6. The known to inferred ratio of 2.03 given in Table 16 is an 




























Table 16: Ratio of Known Odds to Inferred Odds        
Sample 
Number of 
Observations Badrate Odds Ratio 
Accepts 
Goods 31389 




7.53% 12.28662295 Bads 4386 
Total 58275 
Development 
(Accepts + Rejects) 







Known to Inferred Odds Ratio 2.03078669 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
4.4.3 Univariate Analysis 
 
The initial list of variables available for scorecard development consisted of all the information 
captured during the loan application process. A multitude of over a hundred fields was reduced 
by removing variables based on the following criteria: variables with only one attribute across 
applicants, variables which are not sufficiently or correctly populated, variables not applicable 
for the scorecard and variables that are represented by other characteristics. An ensuing list of 
fifteen variables or characteristics eligible for consideration in the model development was then 
selected based on the expert judgement and general logic of the author. Each characteristic was 
grouped and transformed into its WoE.   
 
A preliminary step performed before estimating the scoring model was to conduct a univariate 
analysis for each variable. The purpose was to identify variables which make sense in a business 
context, can be surveyed with relative ease and which show high discriminatory power for the 
purpose of developing the scoring function. Univariate analysis helps reduce the complexity of 
the ensuing multivariate analysis, thus facilitating the model development process substantially. 
Through a series of statistical analyses, individual variables in Table 7 were each examined for 
eligibility in the final scorecard development.  
 
Univariate analysis alone served to reduce the catalogue of fifteen variables down to eight, as 




process. The Population Stability Index (PSI) measures the stability of population in each group 
of a classed variable. A stable PSI has a value of 0.1 or less (Marimo & Chimedza, 2017).  With 
reference to Section 3.6.6, an individual variable is deemed to be able to differentiate risk if its 
GS compared to the dependant variable is at least 4. Further, the WoE across the groups of an 
individual variable need to be monotonic and the volume of observations in each group should 
be at least five percent. Figure 13 in Appendix B provides the WoE and population of 
observations in each variable. The variables violating the preceding conditions were excluded 
from the analysis. Variable selection criteria is summarised in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Univariate Statistics 
  Variable Source 
Gini 
Statistics PSI Inc. Reason For Exclusion 
1 Excess Internal 17.16 0.0323 Yes N/A 
2 Credit Enquiries Bureau 21.80 0.0203 Yes  N/A 
3 Time since Last Transaction Internal 11.67 0.0326 Yes  N/A 
4 Time with Lender Internal 24.28 0.0593 Yes  N/A 
5 Sector Internal 9.53 0.0022 Yes  N/A 
6 Worst Excess Bureau 8.99 0.5041 Yes Unstable 
7 Worst Bureau Report Bureau 9.93 0.0068 Yes N/A 
8 Enquiries Recent Bureau 16.12 0.4157 Yes Unstable 
9 Time since payment profile Internal 13.34 0.9400 No Unstable 
10 Time since last enquiry Bureau 18.06 0.5490 No Inability to differentiate risk 
11 Worst Report Recent Bureau 6.82 0.5510 No  Inability to differentiate risk 
12 Worst Ever Arrears Bureau 19.35 0.9810 No Unstable 
13 Time since last transaction Internal 16.25 0.5670 No Unstable 
14 Cheque Account Transaction Internal 2.11 0.7220 No Inability to differentiate risk 
15 Guinness Rating Internal 19.77 0.6820 No Unstable 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
4.4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Multivariate analysis entails statistical procedures used to determine how the independent 
variables considered for further analysis work together in the model fitting process. 
Multicollinearity diagnostics were used to select the characteristics for the initial models. 
Stepwise Logistic Regression as discussed in Section 3.6.6 was used to fit subsequent models 
after multi-collinearity has been removed. Models were examined for logical trend, for 
example, reverse signs on parameter estimates whilst aiming for parsimonious models, i.e. 
minimisation of the number of variables whilst not losing predictive power. Validation of model 
fit on the independent hold out (validation) sample was performed. The resultant models 





4.4.5 Model Fitting: Internal and Bureau Variables 
 
Table 18: Model 1 - Internal and Bureau Variables 










Intercept 2.7155 0.0146 34676.980 15.112 186.2176 <.0001 
Excess -0.5027 0.0438 131.8428 1.653 11.48228 <.0001 
Credit Enquiries -0.9213 0.0377 596.2210 2.513 24.41764 <.0001 
Time since Last Transaction -0.7320 0.0583 157.54960 2.079 12.55188 <.0001 
Time with Lender -0.6970 0.0310 505.7309 2.008 22.48846 <.0001 
Sector -0.7426 0.0521 202.7845 2.101 14.24024 <.0001 
Worst Bureau Report -0.6899 0.0497 192.3296 1.994 13.86829 <.0001 
Likelihood Ratio   2611.2488   <.0001 
Score   2650.6101   <.0001 
Wald   2495.5706   <.0001 
N 90922 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
Parameter estimates of the six variables are all significant at 95% confidence level. The global 
tests show that the model with covariates is significantly different from a null model. Variables 
selected are significant drivers of the default rate in the SME credit industry.   
 
4.4.6 Model Fitting: Internal Variables Only 
 
Table 19: Model 2 - Internal Variables Only 










Intercept 2.717 0.0144 35810.95 15.135 189.2378 <.0001 
Excess -0.5425 0.0434 156.2004 1.720 12.49802 <.0001 
Time since Last Transaction -0.6847 0.0579 140.0839 1.983 11.8357 <.0001 
Time with Lender -0.8261 0.0305 735.7736 2.284 27.12515 <.0001 
Sector -0.8053 0.0518 241.2156 2.237 15.53112 <.0001 
Likelihood Ratio   1856.5968   <.0001 
Score   1864.4482   <.0001 
Wald   1786.9986   <.0001 
N 90922 
 




The model built on internal variables only is significant both at global level and at individual 
parameters. Thus, the model is significantly different from a null model. Model 1 and Model 2 
were compared to determine the benefit of inclusion/exclusion of bureau information in the 
SME Application Scorecard.  
 
4.4.7 Final Model Selection 
 
The two models described in the preceding sections were compared using various statistical 
measures. Both models were applied to the validation sample to ascertain model fitness. 
Satisfactory results were observed in both cases. In hindsight, the benefit of including/excluding 
rejected applications in the models was determined.  
 
Figure 10: ROC Curves 
 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
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Bureau & Internal 
Fields (Model 1) 38.4 37.6 38.6 37.5 2.07% 2.96% 
Internal Fields Only 
(Model 2) 32.6 30.8 32.3 29.7 5.76% 8.69% 
% increase in Gini 18.0% 22.2% 19.3% 25.9%   
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Table 20 provides measures of the discriminatory power of the models. An eighteen percent 
increase in GS is realised when the Bureau information is added as part of the covariates. A 
benefit of 2.07 percent in discriminatory power is realised if the scorecard model development 
includes the reject inference process. Similar trends were observed in the validation sample. 
Further, this is confirmed by the ROC curve (Lorenz curve) in Figure 10 that Model 1 exhibits 
a better discriminatory power than Model 2 as it lies closer to the top left quadrant of the plot. 
 
4.4.8 Scorecard Points 
 
Model 1 (Internal + Bureau Fields) was finally selected as the best model for application in the 
development of the SME scorecard. The model was fitted to the development set to obtain 
probabilities of default. These probabilities were then converted into scorecard points per 
variable per category within each variable. Scorecard points are linked to the probabilities 
returned by the model in each case. The intuitiveness of scorecard points, badrate and WoE for 
every variable in scope is provided below. 
 
4.4.9 Final Variable Statistics 
 
1. Credit Enquiries 
Table 21: Credit Enquiries 
Credit Enquiries Scorecard Points WoE Goods Bads Badrate 
01 : Low to <= 1 41 0.6118 13365.72404 479.7830401 3.47% 
02 : > 1 to <= 3 18 0.2644 28089.19044 1427.123515 4.84% 
05 : > 3 to <= 9 -1 -0.0162 25733.06009 1730.913592 6.30% 
11 : > 9 to <= 12 -29 -0.4354 5921.000083 605.6545366 9.28% 
12 : > 12 to High -37 -0.5533 12168.92992 1400.507112 10.32% 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
The variable Credit Enquiries is a bureau field detailing the number of enquiries made by the 
applicant in the past twelve months. It satisfied the univariate analysis criteria as shown in 
Figure 11. The population in each group exceeded five percent. The bad rate, WoE and the 
scorecard points curves are intuitive and monotonic. The larger the number of enquiries, the 
more uncertain and riskier the applicant is. The bad rate increases with an increase in the 
number of enquiries.  Risky applicants have been allocated the lowest scorecard points. This 





Figure 11: Univariate Selection Criteria 
 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
 
2. Time since Last Transaction 
Table 22: Time since Last Transaction 
Time since Last 
Transaction (months) Scorecard Points WoE Goods Bads Badrate 
0 16 0.2957 14383.31677 708.2523992 4.69% 
00: Missing -3 -0.0543 13879.35187 969.8282712 6.53% 
03 : > 0 to <= 5 7 0.136 38048.75622 2198.078426 5.46% 
08 : > 5 to <= 10 -12 -0.2207 8968.773373 740.1437171 7.62% 
10 : > 10 to <= 25 -20 -0.3771 7150.569308 690.0311119 8.80% 
13 : > 25 to High -31 -0.5833 2847.13702 337.6478697 10.60% 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
The higher the number of months since an applicant’s last credit transaction, the greater the 
likelihood of the applicant not having enough funds to meet debt obligations and thus the higher 
the risk of default. Thus, the worst scorecard points allocation falls in the highest bracket of this 
variable. 
 
3. Time with Lender 
Table 23: Time with Lender 
Time with Lender 
(months) Scorecard Points WoE Goods Bads Badrate 
1:00 New to Bank 6 0.117 11255.50475 662.6782406 5.56% 
02 : > 0 to <= 12 -48 -0.9461 4417.26264 753.01663 14.56% 
03 : > 12 to <= 18 -35 -0.6935 3383.392057 447.9991329 11.69% 


























































05 : > 24 to <= 33 -20 -0.4016 3836.680936 379.4216338 9.00% 
06 : > 33 to <= 54 -10 -0.1891 7740.215539 618.9333206 7.40% 
08 : > 54 to <= 63 -6 -0.1149 3114.742058 231.2523917 6.91% 
09 : > 63 to <= 75 3 0.0687 4366.76174 269.8152901 5.82% 
10 : > 75 to <= 84 8 0.1635 3381.998157 190.0766928 5.32% 
11 : > 84 to <= 93 11 0.2145 3332.768537 177.9909928 5.07% 
12 : > 93 to <= 138 14 0.2876 15351.55696 762.0391878 4.73% 
16 : > 138 to <= 153 17 0.3315 4098.585437 194.7132633 4.54% 
17 : > 153 to <= 270 29 0.5847 14499.19024 534.7366452 3.56% 
21 : > 270 to High 47 0.9259 3473.841391 91.08138948 2.55% 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
Applicants who have been the lender’s clients for a longer time period are perceived to have a 
low default risk and have therefore been allocated with the highest scorecard points. 
 
4. Excess 
Table 24: Excess 
Excess Scorecard Points WoE Goods Bads Badrate 
01: High -18 -0.4858 5946.34370 639.720802 9.71% 
06: Medium -9 -0.2454 39080.1601 3305.75989 7.80% 
03: Low 16 0.4439 37921.0940 1610.06386 4.07% 
05: Never 20 0.5561 2330.30662 88.43723469 3.66% 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
At the point of application, customers are allocated excess levels. Business entities which have 




Table 25: Sector 
Sector Scorecard Points WoE Goods Bads Badrate 
01 : Missing 113 2.1039 5.765305757 0.046544243 0.80% 
02: Retail 6 0.1142 39248.31299 2317.178511 5.57% 
03: Construction -17 -0.3248 19488.07644 1784.704503 8.39% 
04: Transport -14 -0.2592 5922.884616 507.9624441 7.90% 
05: Trade -5 -0.0922 5562.503692 403.698418 6.77% 
06: Services 56 1.0488 3535.99568 81.99309005 2.27% 
07: Manufacturing 18 0.329 11514.36585 548.3982848 4.55% 




Of the non-missing categories, the services sector has been observed to be the best performing 
with the least bad rate. Construction industry has been the riskiest and therefore allocated 
comparatively the lowest scorecard points. 
 
6. Worst Bureau Report 
Table 26: Worst Bureau Report 
WrstCBReport Scorecard Points WoE Goods Bads Badrate 
01: C (Worst) -51 -1.0295 31.84074861 5.899801386 15.63% 
02: D -3 -0.0694 3976.712801 282.1089394 6.62% 
03: F  36 0.7191 727.4598513 23.45613871 3.12% 
04: N 6 0.1158 66224.36464 3903.819676 5.57% 
05: O -27 -0.5364 8032.360169 909.009951 10.17% 
06: S -19 -0.373 5232.890076 502.9072244 8.77% 
07: X (Best) 71 1.4232 1052.276276 16.78006413 1.57% 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
The worse the principal’s credit bureau report, the higher the risk of default and thus, the lower 
the scorecard points allocated. 
 
4.4.10 Scoring Alignment Parameters 
 
The scorecard is aligned to: 
 A score of 500 has Good: Bad odds of 5:1 
 50 points double the odds 
 
These parameters were chosen in order to reflect the portfolio bad rate at the reference score. 
In this case, the development sample odds ratio is 15.11 as shown in Table 27. For a score of 
500 to represent this and a bad rate of 6.21%, the following function is used to determine the 








− 1 ≈ 5 
 
Figure 12 and Table 28 demonstrate the relationship between the theoretical Odds, Log (Odds) 




Table 27: Scorecard Alignment Parameters 
Alignment Parameter Value 
Bad Rate (Accepts + Rejects) 6.21% 
Reference odds 15 
Reference Score 500 
Points to double odds 50 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
Table 28: The SME Application Scorecard 
Scaling:  500 = 5:1 with 50 points to double the odds 





250 0.5 1 0.46875 -0.758 68.09% 
300 0.9 1 0.9375 -0.065 51.61% 
350 1.9 1 1.875 0.629 34.78% 
400 3.8 1 3.75 1.322 21.05% 
450 7.5 1 7.5 2.015 11.76% 
500 15.0 1 15 2.708 6.21% 
550 30.0 1 30 3.401 3.23% 
600 60.0 1 60 4.094 1.64% 
650 120.0 1 120 4.787 0.83% 
700 240.0 1 240 5.481 0.41% 
750 480.0 1 480 6.174 0.21% 
800 960.0 1 960 6.867 0.10% 
850 1920.0 1 1920 7.560 0.05% 
Source: Estimates from research data, 2019 
 
Figure 12: Bad Rate - Log (Odds) Relationship 
 
 

































4.4.11 SME Scorecard Implementation 
 
At the point of loan application, the client profile gets scored according to the respective 
scorecard points allocation of the six variables above. A constant of 500 discussed in the 
preceding section gets added to the total score of applicants obtained from each of the six 
drivers of risk. Table 27 shows the alignment parameters linking the total score of individual 
applications to the scorecard. The scorecard rejects any applications with scores less than 500 







CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
  
This chapter concludes the study on survival of the fittest SMEs in accessing commercial bank 
funding in South Africa. This entails a summary of the investigation and the conclusions drawn 
from the empirical research findings. Further, this chapter highlights the limitations of the 
underlying investigation and lastly provide recommendations to various stakeholders in the 
SME credit industry to improve the current state of credit supply and ideas for future research.   
 
5.2 Summary of the Study  
 
To examine the credit quality of SMEs and to investigate the linkage between the domestic 
economy and the SME credit industry, this study made use of a wealth of information extracted 
from one of the leading banks in South Africa. Based on the applications submitted for the 
overdraft facility, monthly application cohorts were drawn over a period of seven years from 
July 2012 to July 2019. The information comprised a multitude of variables or fields populated 
against thousands of applications received by the lender for every month in observation. 
Variables spanned the entire spectrum of dimensions, from standard fields such as unique 
application number and month of application to risk related attributes such as the industry in 
which the SME operate and its relationship with the bank. To enhance stability and relevance 
of the outcomes, external data were sourced from Moody’s and Experian. Macroeconomic 
factors and macroprudential indicators were obtained from Moody’s, a top global credit rating 
agency whilst credit data for the individual principal business owners were sourced from 
Experian, one of the renowned credit bureau institutions in South Africa.  
 
Exploratory data analysis revealed a significant decline in the number of applications received 
over time during the period under investigation. Subsequently, the success rate in obtaining 
loans as reflected in the acceptance rate plummeted drastically in 2015 at a point when the 
prime lending rate increased. This intuitively translated into an increase in borrowing costs and 
therefore notable scepticism on the part of borrowers to submit applications and the lender to 
issue loans. Multiple correlation analyses and econometrics approaches were employed to 
determine the statistical relationship between changes in the economy as reflected by the 




funding as well as the demand for credit within the SME sector. The analysis showed a highly 
positive relationship between economic growth and accessibility to bank loans.  
The known application scorecards for SMEs were developed and implemented in developed 
countries such as the US and UK. In these countries, the use of pooled data (where data comes 
from multiple lenders) in formulating SME scorecards proved to be a success in terms of cost 
effectiveness, improved bad debt management and regulatory compliance on the back of 
enhanced risk control in the developed world. This has not effectively been developed for and 
implemented in developing countries due to data scarcity and the bureaucratic nature of the 
businesses. It was worthwhile therefore to develop an application scorecard bespoke to SMEs 
for one of the leading banks under the presumption that this can be generalised for the 
countrywide SME credit industry. Drawing on learnings from the developed world, this study 
adopted a similar approach by developing an application scorecard bespoke to SMEs in an 
emerging market context but from a single money lending financial institution. The application 
scorecard developed in this study is set to enable the lenders to quantify the risk associated with 
SME loan applicants and offer improvements on objective decision-making processes and 
reduces transaction costs as seen in the developed world as highlighted in literature. 
A sophisticated binary target logistic regression statistical approach was used in the 
development of the SME application scorecard. The target or dependent variable was derived 
as an indicator of whether the borrower defaulted on its overdraft facility within the first 
eighteen months of access to the loan. Independent or explanatory variables were assessed so 
that insufficiently or incorrectly populated fields were excluded from the analysis. Fields 
concentrated with one attribute were also removed. The final list was selected based on the 
expert judgement of the author as well as statistical selection criteria such as monotonicity of 
the bad rate, monotonicity of weight of evidence, population stability on coarse classification 
of the variable over time and its ability to differentiate risk through Gini Statistics. Selection 
guidelines for each of the approaches were precisely followed. Univariate analysis reduced a 
catalogue of more than a hundred potential explanatory variables down to fifteen. In a 
multivariate analysis context, explanatory variables were assessed for multicollinearity and this 
further reduced the final list of variables to six, two of which were obtained from the bureaux. 
Given that the application scorecard is developed for use on through the door applicants, it was 
imperative to design a model that reflects the riskiness of SME borrowers. Therefore, to achieve 




the application scorecard considered all applications received by the lender, regardless of 
whether the application was accepted or rejected. Of the accepted applications, some were not 
taken up due to the issues of cold scoring. The taken up/non taken up model was developed to 
determine the likelihood of the rejected applications to take up the loan should it have been 
accepted. Further, a Known Good Bad (KGB) model was developed to assign inferred 
performance to the rejected applications through the reject inference process. The KGB model 
tracked the performance of the accepted and taken up population from the point of application 
to at least eighteen months in performance. This was done to generate the target variable and 
to assign weights to all the data including accepts and rejects used for the development of the 
scorecard.  The SME application scorecard developed herein can be used to decide whether to 
extend credit to SMEs with an aim to reduce defaults and serious delinquencies on new 
applicants. In addition, the model can also be used to allocate capital, determine risk tendency 
and monitor the performance of SME credit portfolio. 
5.3 Conclusion  
 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the success rate of SME applications for 
commercial funding with an objective to assess the relationship between the demand and supply 
of credit against the credit market industry growth. From a risk rating perspective, the objective 
was to identify drivers of default and determine how the model is affected by introducing 
external information such as bureau data.  
 
From the empirical investigation conducted, it can be concluded that there is a high positive 
correlation between the trends in the economy and accessibility to funding. The economic 
trends showed a decline in performance and so was the demand and supply of credit in the 
credit industry over time. 
 
The robustness and stability of an SME application scorecard is enhanced by the inclusion of 
the rejected population as well as internal and bureau information. Through statistical 
comparison metrics discussed in Chapter 4, it can be concluded that this collective information 
can be used to establish drivers of default and develop an effective application scorecard as part 
of credit risk management. From the six variables selected in the final model it can be concluded 





a. operate in the services industry 
b. have a long-standing rapport with the bank 
c. keep excess to the minimal 
d. keep active the transactional account with the bank 
e. keep credit enquiries to the minimum 
f. principal business owner should maintain a good credit record on all his loans 
Indeed, the applicants who won’t survive the lending criteria at bank include start-ups and 
young businesses as they do not have a long-standing relationship with the bank as a business.  
The construction industry was scored with the least scorecard points showing that it is the 
riskiest industry in terms credit. This industry is labour and capital intensive. Production could 
have been hampered by power outages experienced in the review period because of operational 
issues at Eskom, the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) power parastatal. Electricity shortages 
weighs down production and it makes it difficult for the industries to keep up with their 
financial obligations. This results in serious delinquencies on loans and hampers access to 
commercial bank finance to through the door applicants operating in construction.  
 
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
Following are the limitations of this study 
 
 Single product offering selection: Customers can obtain credit through various bank 
product offerings including secured and unsecured term loans. This study is restricted 
to an unsecured transactional and revolving loan facility as this is the information 
approved for the research purposes and it provides the most substantial records.  
 Choice of variables: Since the data was limited to a single product offering from a single 
financial institution, this influenced the choice of variables. 
 Regulatory Restrictions: International legislation prevents the use of certain variables 
such as gender and population group in decision science. This is meant to prevent 
unreasonable prejudices (Hand & Henley, 1997). Classification should be based only 
on merit. Therefore, variables prohibited by law were not used in this study. 
 Limited to a single banking institution: This investigation is depended on credit policies 




issues of confidentiality, credit information from other financial institutions could not 
be obtained or used to draw solid, market wide conclusions.  
 Limited to an emerging market: The study is based on information recorded in the South 
African emerging market and does not diversify into developed countries and frontier 
economies. The recommendations thus may just be limited to the South African market 




Based on the scorecard points allocation discussed in Chapter Four, start-ups and young 
businesses are recommended to frequently transact with commercial banks if loans are desired 
in future. The higher the transaction frequency, the higher the chance of accessing bank loans. 
Beyond transactions, SMEs are encouraged to establish strong networks and sound 
relationships with commercial banks as it becomes easier to obtain loans on the back of long-
standing relationships. Further, the principal business owners are recommended to be vigilant 
with their financial obligations across the credit lending landscape as their creditworthiness, 
captured by the bureau information, has a huge bearing on access to commercial bank funding.  
 
For future research, it is worthwhile incorporating various dimensions of product offerings, 
secured and unsecured lending, amortising and revolving products, to obtain a more holistic 
view of the behaviour of SME customers within the bank. Credit bureau institutions such as 
TransUnion and Experian have access to credit information from various banking and non-
banking financial services institutions. It would be valuable for these bureaux to develop 
application scorecard bespoke to the SME credit market in emerging and frontier markets by 
consolidating this information to improve debt management, risk control and cost effectiveness. 
SMEs form an integral aspect of most economies globally. Small businesses are inclined to 
foster innovative entrepreneurship and gratify a variety of socio-economic objectives such as 
poverty alleviation, income generation, employment creation and reduce societal inequalities. 
Findings from this study show that, the success of SMEs is largely dependent on the 
performance of the economy. The deterioration in economic growth observed in this study is 
in synchronisation with the country’s credit ratings. During the period under review, Fitch and 




to the sub investment grade or junk status as the country notably fell into technical recession. 
With the elections behind the nation, the government is recommended to ratify policy reforms 
targeted at boosting economic growth. SMEs operating in the construction and manufacturing 
industries should be prioritised as these produce lucrative value-added products. Due to the 
labour-intensive nature of these industries, increased growth in such sectors can help mitigate 
the unemployment challenges. South Africa currently stands at an unemployment rate of 
roughly 27%, which is alarmingly one of the worst levels globally. Increased focus on SME 
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Table 29: DTI Classification of SMEs in South Africa  
Sector or sub-sectors in 
accordance with the Standard 
Industrial Classification Size or class 
Total full-time 
equivalent of paid 




Total gross asset 
value (fixed property 
excluded) Less than: 
Agriculture 
Medium  100 R 4.00 m  R 4.00 m  
Small  50 R 2.00 m  R 2.00 m  
Very small  10 R 0.40 m  R 0.40 m 
Micro 5 R 0.15 m  R 0.10 m 
Mining and Quarrying 
Medium  200 R30.00 m  R18.00 m 
Small  50 R 7.50 m  R 4.50 m  
Very small  20 R 3.00 m R 1.80 m  
Micro 5  R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Manufacturing 
Medium  200 R40.00 m  R15.00 m  
Small  50 R10.00 m  R 3.75 m  
Very small  20 R 4.00 m  R 1.50 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Electricity, Gas and Water 
Medium  200 R40.00 m  R15.00 m  
Small  50 R10.00 m  R 3.75 m  
Very small  20 R 4.00 m  R 1.50 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Construction 
Medium  200 R20.00 m  R 4.00 m  
Small  50 R 5.00 m  R 1.00 m 
Very small  20 R 2.00 m  R 0.40 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Retail and Motor Trade and Repair 
Services 
Medium  100 R30.00 m  R 5.00 m 
Small  50 R15.00 m  R 2.50 m  
Very small  10 R 3.00 m  R 0.50 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Wholesale Trade, Commercial 
Agents and 
Allied Services 
Medium  100 R50.00 m  R 8.00 m 
Small  50 R25.00 m  R 4.00 m  
Very small  10 R 5.00 m  R 0.50 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Catering, Accommodation and 
other Trade 
Medium  100 R10.00 m  R 2.00 m  
Small  50 R 5.00 m  R 1.00 m  
Very small  10 R 1.00 m  R 0.20 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Transport, Storage and 
Communications 
Medium  100 R20.00 m  R 5.00 m  
Small  50 R10.00 m  R 2.50 m  
Very small  10 R 2.00 m  R 0.50 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Finance and Business Services 
Medium  100 R20.00 m  R 4.00 m  
Small  50 R10.00 m  R 2.00 m  
Very small  10 R 2.00 m  R 0.40 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 
Community, Social and Personal 
Services 
Medium  100 R10.00 m  R 5.00 m  
Small  50 R 5.00 m  R 2.50 m  
Very small  10 R 1.00 m  R 0.50 m  
Micro 5 R 0.15 m R 0.10 m 











Table 30: VAR Models - Demand for Credit 
Model Parameter Estimates 
Equation Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
GDP CONST2 -0.34780 0.41939 -0.83 0.4097 1 
 AR1_2_1 -0.00293 0.01897 -0.15 0.8777 volume(t-1) 
 AR1_2_2 1.58792 0.09154 17.35 0.0001 gdp(t-1) 
 AR1_2_3 0.00305 0.00858 0.36 0.7230 overdrafts_and_loans(t-1) 
 AR1_2_4 0.04138 0.11029 0.38 0.7086 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-1) 
 AR1_2_5 0.78221 0.74814 1.05 0.2993 prime(t-1)                       
 AR2_2_1 0.01138 0.01920 0.59 0.5553 volume(t-2)                      
 AR2_2_2 -0.69430 0.09184 -7.56 0.0001 gdp(t-2)                         
 AR2_2_3 0.00540 0.00900 0.60 0.5506 overdrafts_and_loans(t-2)        
 AR2_2_4 -0.12830 0.11362 -1.13 0.2626 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-2) 
 AR2_2_5 -0.52591 0.71713 -0.73 0.4657 prime(t-2)                       
OL CONST3 14.10442 7.86637 1.79 0.0772 1 
 AR1_3_1 0.04959 0.35588 0.14 0.8896 volume(t-1) 
 AR1_3_2 -0.67552 1.71690 -0.39 0.6951 gdp(t-1) 
 AR1_3_3 1.35468 0.16101 8.41 0.0001 overdrafts_and_loans(t-1) 
 AR1_3_4 0.89229 2.06865 0.43 0.6675 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-1) 
 AR1_3_5 -10.39426 14.03259 -0.74 0.4613 prime(t-1)                       
 AR2_3_1 0.19980 0.36018 0.55 0.5808 volume(t-2)                      
 AR2_3_2 1.23782 1.72253 0.72 0.4747 gdp(t-2)                         
 AR2_3_3 -0.57933 0.16885 -3.43 0.0010 overdrafts_and_loans(t-2)        
 AR2_3_4 0.68445 2.13113 0.32 0.7490 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-2) 
 AR2_3_5 2.30352 13.45101 0.17 0.8645 prime(t-2)                       
PLR CONST5 0.13514 0.04826 2.80 0.0065 1 
 AR1_5_1 -0.00367 0.00218 -1.68 0.0975 volume(t-1) 
 AR1_5_2 0.00496 0.01053 0.47 0.6390 gdp(t-1) 
 AR1_5_3 -0.00027 0.00099 -0.27 0.7868 overdrafts_and_loans(t-1) 
 AR1_5_4 0.00006 0.01269 0.00 0.9961 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-1) 
 AR1_5_5 1.56871 0.08609 18.22 0.0001 prime(t-1)                       
 AR2_5_1 0.00035 0.00221 0.16 0.8750 volume(t-2)                      
 AR2_5_2 -0.00087 0.01057 -0.08 0.9347 gdp(t-2)                         
 AR2_5_3 -0.00061 0.00104 -0.59 0.5598 overdrafts_and_loans(t-2)        
 AR2_5_4 0.01098 0.01307 0.84 0.4036 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-2) 
 AR2_5_5 -0.62615 0.08252 -7.59 0.0001 prime(t-2)                       




Table 31: VAR Models - Supply of Credit 
Model Parameter Estimates 
Equation Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
GDP CONST2 0.39120 0.27795 1.41 0.1636 1 
 AR1_2_1 0.04280 0.03945 1.08 0.2816 acceptance_rate(t-1) 
 AR1_2_2 1.63063 0.09321 17.49 0.0001 gdp(t-1) 
 AR1_2_3 0.02364 0.06238 0.38 0.7059 overdrafts_and_loans(t-1) 
 AR1_2_4 0.04529 0.08718 0.52 0.6050 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-1) 
 AR1_2_5 0.31581 0.72382 0.44 0.6639 prime(t-1)                  
 AR2_2_1 -0.05198 0.03998 -1.30 0.1977 acceptance_rate(t-2)             
 AR2_2_2 -0.72650 0.09387 -7.74 0.0001 gdp(t-2)                         
 AR2_2_3 -0.01121 0.06075 -0.18 0.8541 overdrafts_and_loans(t-2)        
 AR2_2_4 -0.05876 0.08955 -0.66 0.5138 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-2) 
 AR2_2_5 -0.41209 0.73051 -0.56 0.5744 prime(t-2)                       
OL CONST3 1.11285 0.58230 1.91 0.0600 1 
 AR1_3_1 0.01124 0.08264 0.14 0.8922 acceptance_rate(t-1) 
 AR1_3_2 -0.35446 0.19527 -1.82 0.0737 gdp(t-1) 
 AR1_3_3 1.34353 0.13069 10.28 0.0001 overdrafts_and_loans(t-1) 
 AR1_3_4 0.06778 0.18263 0.37 0.7116 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-1) 
 AR1_3_5 -0.20276 1.51640 -0.13 0.8940 prime(t-1)                       
 AR2_3_1 -0.01836 0.08375 -0.22 0.8271 acceptance_rate(t-2)             
 AR2_3_2 0.46447 0.19667 2.36 0.0209 gdp(t-2)                         
 AR2_3_3 -0.51267 0.12728 -4.03 0.0001 overdrafts_and_loans(t-2)        
 AR2_3_4 0.12777 0.18761 0.68 0.4981 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-2) 
 AR2_3_5 -0.40815 1.53041 -0.27 0.7905 prime(t-2)                       
PLR CONST4 0.05057 0.03250 1.56 0.1241 1 
 AR1_4_1 0.00076 0.00461 0.17 0.8694 acceptance_rate(t-1) 
 AR1_4_2 -0.00046 0.01090 -0.04 0.9667 gdp(t-1) 
 AR1_4_3 -0.00716 0.00729 -0.98 0.3295 overdrafts_and_loans(t-1) 
 AR1_4_4 0.00331 0.01019 0.32 0.7463 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-1) 
 AR1_4_5 1.64295 0.08463 19.41 0.0001 prime(t-1)                       
 AR2_4_1 -0.00324 0.00467 -0.69 0.4900 acceptance_rate(t-2)             
 AR2_4_2 0.00308 0.01098 0.28 0.7798 gdp(t-2)                         
 AR2_4_3 0.00505 0.00710 0.71 0.4797 overdrafts_and_loans(t-2)        
 AR2_4_4 0.00197 0.01047 0.19 0.8511 credit_extended_to_houseolds(t-2) 
 AR2_4_5 -0.67168 0.08541 -7.86 0.0001 prime(t-2)                       
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